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Abstract 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that examine water management and 
conservation programs through the context of sustainable development.  These essays are distinct 
case studies of national, state and local policies.  Their common approach is that they all use 
common-pool resources theory to generate specific recommendations for policymaking and 
water management. 
The first essay explores opportunities for developing policy measures to prevent the 
collapse of the vital irrigation infrastructure in the Aral Sea region.  The paper looks at the 
economic efficiency of various policy options, impacts on the country’s agricultural sector, and 
the regulations needed to make the cost-sharing irrigation system viable.  The results define 
institutional changes necessary to make reforms feasible.  The rationale for policy reform is 
based on the need to (i) facilitate the transition from a centrally planned agriculture to a market-
oriented system; (ii) mediate, if not resolve, land tenure and water management issues; and (iii) 
analyze the importance of the irrigation infrastructure for sustainable agricultural development. 
The second essay examines opportunities for integrating conservation in Arkansas water 
policy.  The paper defines institutional factors and rules-in-use as affecting actions at a state level 
policy for long-term water management.  The findings identify the opportunities for integrating 
conservation in Arkansas water policy, and the need for re-conceptualizing the nature of state 
policy towards water resources.  It proposes to identify goals and strategies, socioeconomic 
indicators, and resource indicators to determine if the state is moving toward sustainable water 
resources, as well as to categorize appropriate management tools. 
The third essay examines efforts to protect the environment and ensure adequate water to 
sustain irrigated agriculture in the Bayou Meto Basin, Arkansas.  The paper analyses economic 
and distributional effects of the project to evaluate the policy outcomes in terms of benefits and 
costs on different stakeholder groups.  The findings show the need for integrated water 
management and to account for opportunity costs of water, including costs associated with 
economic and environmental externalities.  Kaldor-Hicks tableau displays net benefits and 
impact on all stakeholders, which can help to identify the right kinds of incentives for 
stakeholder participation to make the project politically feasible.  
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Chapter I.  Introduction 
The overarching theme of this dissertation is investigation of common-pool resource 
policy for water management and conservation programs.  This work contributes to the public 
policy debate and to our understanding through the context of economic development and the 
environment.  The substantive policy areas for my research are agricultural policy, 
environmental policy, natural resources management and community development.  By 
grounding myself in regional economics and combining my training in public policy, as well as 
my interests in sustainable development and natural resource management, I have conducted 
research that is interdisciplinary in nature, and relevant to current policy issues. 
This dissertation is accomplished using a three-essay format.  By incorporating case 
studies and institutional and benefit-cost analyses, the dissertation brings a well-rounded 
approach to the study of public policy issues associated with common-pool resources.  The 
introductory chapter summarizes the literature on open-access common-pool resources, describes 
the research problem, provides background information, and reviews the study design and data 
sources.  The following three chapters are case study analyses of regulation of common-pool 
water resources at national, state, and local levels.  Essay 1, titled “Common-Pool Resources 
Management: Needs Assessment for Irrigation Policy Reform in the Aral Sea Region” is a 
national level policy analysis.  Essay 2, titled “Integrating Conservation in Arkansas State Water 
Policy” is a state level policy analysis.  Essay 3, titled “Integrated Assessment of Welfare and 
Distributional Effects of the Bayou Meto Basin Project in Arkansas” examines national-state-
local partnerships addressing a common-pool resource problem in Arkansas.  The final chapter 
summarizes the general themes of essays analyzing common pool resources, policy implications, 





Overdrawing of critical aquifers and irrigation resources, depletion of valuable fisheries, 
and dumping of pollutants into the air are examples of common pool problems.  Unfortunately, 
many of these open-access problems persist, and the discussion here suggests why that is the 
case.  Throughout this chapter, the terms common pool, commons, and open access are used 
interchangeably.  According to Elinor Ostrom (1990), a common-pool resource is a “…natural or 
man-made resource system that is sufficiently large to make it costly (but not impossible) to 
exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (p. 30).  However, John 
Baden (1998) defines common-pool resources as “resources for which there are multiple owners 
(or a number of people who have nonexclusive rights of use to the resource) and where one or a 
set of users can have adverse effects upon the interests of other users” (p. 52). 
Common-pool resources often require some type of regulation of access and use to avoid 
wasteful exploitation.  H. Scott Gordon (1954) examined the economic theory of natural resource 
utilization by considering a single, open access fishery to illustrate the problem of overuse 
(Gordon, 1954).  Garret Hardin (1968) put forward the notion that in situations where there are 
no effective institutions for managing common-pool resources there will be a “free for all” and 
the resources will quickly be depleted, to the detriment of all users.  Hardin’s theory became the 
basis for how scholars (mostly ecologists) thought about common-pool resource management 
and distribution.  It proved, through what is known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Flood, 1952) that 
in instances where there are no institutions (formal or informal) governing resource use, there is 
a lack of trust among, and a lack of knowledge among users of their fellow resource users’ 




access to a common-pool resource (through the formation of an institution) in favor of 
maximizing certain, yet lesser, short term gains.  
Following a set of assumptions about self-interest, communication, and resource 
ownership, Hardin (1968) modeled a case where strategic actors’ rational decisions led to 
collective ruin.  Hardin’s solution to the tragedy of the commons is coercive regulation of 
individual behavior - “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” to escape the “horror of the 
commons” (p. 1247).  And he notes, but does not develop, the critical problem of regulating the 
commons - distributional outcomes that are not acceptable to key parties.  He asserts, however, 
that “injustice is preferable to total ruin.”  But total ruin is not so obvious to all parties in many 
common-pool settings.  The parties often disagree with the timing and appropriate form of 
intervention, and they object to the allocation of the costs and benefits associated with regulating 
the commons.  These concerns raise the transaction costs of reaching agreement on the commons 
problem, affecting both the timing and nature of the action taken. 
A few years earlier, Olson’s (1965) analysis of interest group formation had pointed to 
similar problems associated with individuals acting collectively, even when they have shared 
interests.  Both seminal works suggested a pessimistic view of the likelihood that individuals can 
manage their own affairs effectively in the context of shared resources.  Hardin’s argument, in 
particular, that an outside central authority was needed to impose sanctions on individual 
strategic behavior led to calls for greater government control over resource management 
(Ophuls, 1973; Heilbroner, 1974; Carruthers and Stoner, 1981).  Other scholars argued that 
successful natural resource management would require free market mechanisms (Smith, 1981; 
Baden and Stroup, 1981).  The questions for debate among scholars then became: what are the 




remain in public or private hands?  Some scholars have claimed that only governments have the 
ability to effectively regulate common-pool natural resources, and protect them for all users.  
According to Wittfogel (1957), a centralized, and indeed despotic power, is needed to build and 
operate large-scale infrastructure.  
According to Ostrom (1990), if a common resource is accessed locally by a 
comparatively small number of parties with similar or generally homogeneous objectives and 
production costs, then the problem of overuse often can be effectively addressed through 
informal rules or norms that constrain individual actions.  Under these circumstances it can be 
relatively easier for a small group of similar people who have a history of interaction with one 
another to gather and interpret information about the resource’s status and to agree upon the 
types of uses and constraints necessary to conserve it.  They also can accept the distribution of 
the costs and benefits (and ultimately, of wealth and political power) within the community that 
is inherent in any definition and assignment of use privileges, even under informal arrangements.  
Community management of regional agricultural irrigation water, pastures, or inshore fisheries 
provide examples of successful mitigation of the losses of the commons.1 
Economists, most notably Elinor Ostrom (1990), contend that common-pool resources 
(CPR), regardless of the size of their infrastructures, are often times better “operated” when they 
are controlled directly and collectively by the users of the resources, rather than by remote, 
central government bureaucrats.  What is meant by “better” is that the resources are allocated 
more equitably, used more efficiently, and hence the long-term sustainability of the resource is 
                                                          
1 Ostrom (1990) provides a theory and empirical evidence regarding successful local collective 
action to address common-pool resource problems.  Experiments and more field studies are 
included in Ostrom et al. (1994).  Other case studies and conceptual arguments are in the 
readings included in McCay and Acheson (1987); Ellickson (1991); Hess (1996); Burger et al. 




ensured.  Efficiency of use can be defined in two ways.  First is the idea that when resource users 
realize the scarcity of a resource, they voluntarily impose rules and regulations governing its use.  
They accept the fact that they must contribute in some form or another for the privilege of access 
to the resource.  They will use only the minimal amount necessary, and thus reduce the amount 
of production costs and/or maximize net returns.  Second is the idea that when resources are 
managed directly, operation and/or transaction costs go down.  This is because the government, 
which is regarded as an unnecessary third party, is not present to interfere with direct, one-to-one 
bargaining and negotiation among users, thereby reducing transaction costs.  Ostrom (1990) and 
those who have followed in her footsteps believe that user organized institutions, based on trust 
and cooperation, are inherent to common pool resources, and must be allowed to develop, be 
defined and formalized, and thus strengthened and empowered by users. 
The body of literature drawing on CPR theory shows that common property institutions 
are socially-constructed systems of norms and rules that allocate rights, limit access, and regulate 
the use of commonly held resources.  Resource users hold clear and secure rights to resources, 
and overarching rights and management decisions are vested in the group of users as a whole; 
both rights and responsibilities for joint use are specified, and non-compliers are sanctioned 
(Bromley, 1992; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Oakerson, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Runge, 1992).  
According to McKean (1996), in this way common-property institutions can “make resource 
protectors out of potential resource destroyers, and offer us a way to reap the advantages of 
private property rights on resources without parceling resources that are most productive when 
kept intact” (p. 227). 
Ostrom et al. (1994) provided substantial insight into regularities of human action for 




then numerous scholars have extended Ostrom’s ideas to larger, more complex CPRs such as 
aquifers shared by many users, ocean fisheries, forest ecosystems, and global climate.  Dolsak 
and Ostrom (2003) include empirical and theoretical results from studies of complex, large-scale 
CPRs embedded in economic, political, and legal environments.  Leach and Pelkey (2001) found 
support for several variables from the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
to be important contributors to successful well-defined decision rules.  These include adequate 
technical information, leadership by local stakeholders, recognition by external authorities of the 
users’ right to self-organize, an ambitious scope, and a focus on specific, tangible issues.  The 
IAD framework emphasizes physical attributes, community attributes, and rules-in-use as 
affecting actions and patterns of interaction, which ultimately affect outcomes (Ostrom et al. 
1994). 
These theoretical links recognize the multiple-scale, diverse, complex nature of many 
important CPR systems today.  Several of these items center on users as the primary decision-
makers rather than institutionalized management.  However, the management authority over 
many CPRs is not vested primarily in those who use the resources.  Instead, government 
regulatory authority at the national or state level may play a dominant role in establishing rules 
affecting the CPR.  In contrast, resource users may have substantially less authority, and their 
ability to change rules may be indirect, accomplished, if at all, through communicating with 
government officials who set the rules.  Furthermore, shifting from “users” who directly use a 
CPR to “stakeholders” with an interest in the CPR complicates questions about who should and 
does have a say in management.  For example, a CPR may be used intensively by some 
individuals or groups, but less intensively by others, who perhaps live far away and are not 




constitute a social community in the sense of frequent interactions or shared geographic space.  
In such cases, governmental actors might take a central role in coordinating input from a diverse 
array of stakeholders and ultimately be responsible for making decisions about managing the 
resource.  Such an arrangement represents not user self-governance, but rather mediated 
governance through government officials who are not the primary resource users. 
Success and failure in solving commons problems have been widely studied for local 
surface irrigation systems, among others, especially in Asia (Ostrom, 1992; Wade, 1994; Lam, 
1998).  However, the focus of these studies has not been on aquifer management.  Indeed, studies 
of self-governance for whole aquifers are not common, but this is changing rapidly (Schlager, 
2007; Lopez-Gunn, 2009).  Cases from California show that sustainable groundwater 
management can be achieved utilizing collective action (Blomquist, 1992).  Although 
groundwater plays an important role for domestic use, its major share is devoted to agricultural 
activities.  The United States, China, India, and Pakistan together account for more than 75% of 
the total reported groundwater extraction for agriculture (Moench, 2004).  This illustrates the 
importance of research such as this. 
Aquifers are a source of relatively inexpensive, reliable irrigation that can be developed 
by individuals once either technology or energy is accessible (Schlager, 2007).  Aquifer’s 
subtractability and low excludability characteristics lead to the so-called tragedy of the 
commons, that is, the environmental degradation that occurs whenever a large number of 
individuals share a subtractable resource (Theesfeld, 2010).  However, Feeny et al. (1990) show 
that it is the “tragedy of open access” that matters.  In regions where depletion of groundwater is 




facto open access regimes, or unrestricted open access has been the general rule (Giordano and 
Villholth, 2007).  This study intended to demonstrate this for Arkansas. 
As Vincent Ostrom (1962) stated, “Few areas of American political and economic 
experience offer a richer variety of organizational patterns and institutional arrangements than 
the water resource arena” (p. 450).  In Arkansas, special governmental districts provide basic 
public services, including supply of water for both urban and agricultural uses.  Such districts, 
described as “quasi-governmental,” have special or limited powers.  According to ANRC (2011), 
the Arkansas Irrigation, Drainage and Watershed Improvement District Act authorizes “the 
acquisition by purchase, lease, gift or condemnation of water rights and all other properties . . . 
and all other rights helpful in carrying out the purposes of the organization of the district” (p. 
26).  The governing boards of such districts are authorized to make regulations for “the delivery 
of water owned or acquired by it to users. . .” (ibid, p. 27).   
In Arkansas, the 1957 Regional Water Distribution District Act allows creation of a 
nonprofit regional water distribution district (RWDD) with authority to participate in 
Congressional projects.  These districts were originally used to supply water for municipal and 
industrial uses.  However, this Act has also been used to create districts for the specific purpose 
of supplying agricultural water (ANRC, 2011).  As result, there are approximately thirty RWDDs 
formed under this Act in Arkansas.  Because the primary purpose of the Act was water 
distribution, the only authorized source of district revenue was the sale and distribution of water.  
However, in 1995, the General Assembly authorized the districts to levy assessments.  A district 
is now authorized to develop improvement project plans for improvement project areas within 
the district (ANRC, 2011).  If the improvement plan is approved by the Arkansas Natural 




district, an assessment of benefits accruing to land with the improvement project area is made 
and a tax may be levied against the benefited land to pay for the costs of works of improvement 
for the supplying of irrigation water. 
Research Problem Definition 
The historical and contemporary record of common-pool resources is not a happy one.  
Multiple users each have incentive to deplete shared water resources in the regions that I am 
interested in -- the Aral Sea region of Uzbekistan and the Arkansas Delta region of the United 
States.  I investigate factors that drive the demand for water by irrigated agriculture and other 
sectors in these regions through the lens of common-pool resources theory, and evaluate policy 
options to sustain socio-economic development and preserve the environment in these regions. 
The shrinking of the Aral Sea in Central Asia is considered one of the planet’s worst 
environmental disasters.  Formerly one of the four largest lakes in the world, the Aral Sea has 
been steadily shrinking since the 1960s after the rivers that fed it were diverted to irrigate crop 
production in the region (Bektemirov and Rahimov, 2001).  The implication of this human 
alteration of the environment is that certain characteristics of the region account for the dramatic 
consequences since the canals were dug.  Those consequences range from unexpected climate 
feedbacks to public health issues, affecting the lives of millions of people in the region. 
Water resources in Arkansas, particularly the groundwater in eastern and southern parts 
of the state, are under pressure from increased usage for crop irrigation.  Arkansas supports about 
4.5 million acres of crop production under irrigation, including water demanding crops such as 
rice and cotton.  Groundwater is 73% of the total water used in the state of Arkansas, and the 




The eastern central part of the state is experiencing depletion of the Mississippi Alluvial and 
Sparta aquifers due to pumping at unsustainable rates (ANRC, 2016). 
I believe that these cases are examples of common-pool problems where multiple users 
each have an incentive to deplete a shared resource.  A central research question surfacing in the 
wake of the water crises in these regions has been: how do specific combinations of rules, 
regulations and policies affect the incentives of stakeholders for resource use in different 
institutional settings?  It is hoped that the study will enhance our understanding of the intended 
and unintended consequences of farm, food, and environmental policies that can affect the water 
supply, environmental quality and economic conditions in these regions.  
Research Goal, Design and Data Sources 
The goal of this study is to explore the institutional aspects of policy implementation on 
sustainable qualitative and quantitative water use by, first, taking into account the attributes of 
CPR and, second, undertaking a systematic review of well-documented policies.  As such, this 
research is inspired by the idea of the nested multitier framework developed by Ostrom (2007), 
which considers the attributes of a resource system, the resource units generated by that system, 
the users, and the governance systems that affect the outcomes.  In this context, the resource 
system might be an irrigation system with a certain amount of water to be extracted, the latter 
defined as the resource unit.  This study explores the factors leading to better governance as it 
develops new institutional insights in policy implementation by a joint consideration of 
ecological and socio-political characteristics. 
Research design incorporates a case study method to examine important questions 




research design and construction of causal mechanisms relevant to institutional arrangements to 
manage water resources as CPR.  I believe that a case study approach can provide deeper 
insights into processes and background influences on local community level resource 
management.  I employ the embedded single case study design suggested by Scholz and Tietje 
(2002) and Yin (2003) to develop the research strategy based on certain critical areas in 
Uzbekistan, as well the designated Critical Groundwater Use Areas and specific water projects in 
Arkansas.  Also, I utilize qualitative inquiry as a complement to quantitative examination of 
national and state level policies. 
This dissertation is prepared in a three-paper format.  In the first paper, entitled 
“Common-Pool Resources Management: Needs Assessment for Irrigation Policy Reform in the 
Aral Sea Region” I explore opportunities for developing policy measures to prevent the collapse 
of the vital irrigation infrastructure in the Aral Sea region by examining agriculture irrigation 
through the lenses of CPR theory.  The study draws on the data from surveys and socioeconomic 
information obtained in the region, as well as from other data sources and publications.  I utilize 
quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate how farmers maintain irrigation infrastructure 
and use water resources in their environment.  The research framework that I utilize for this 
study includes the IAD and social capital theories.  Using data obtained from government 
agencies and collected through a water cost-sharing program study in Uzbekistan, I investigate 
the impact of social capital on the conditions of economic capital (irrigation infrastructure) and 
natural capital (water resources) for a cohort of farmers.  
Based on these data, I assess options for a national program in public sector and private 
sector cost-sharing investment and management for irrigation water supply in Uzbekistan.  




can benefit the environment by creating incentives to seek better investments in water saving 
technologies.  Once assured of proper irrigation system operations resulting in sustainable 
production levels, farmers would assume more responsibility over agriculture and water 
management.  At the same time, government costs could be reduced so it could share the “gains” 
from water cost-sharing with the farmers by adjusting the existing state controlled procurement 
system.  The paper looks at the economic efficiency of various policy options as well as impacts 
on the country’s agricultural sector and the regulations needed to make the cost-sharing irrigation 
system viable.  The results identify the institutional changes necessary to make reforms feasible.  
The rationale for policy reform is based on the need to (i) facilitate the transition from a centrally 
planned agriculture to a market-oriented system; (ii) mediate, if not resolve, land tenure and 
water management issues; and (iii) recognize the importance of the irrigation infrastructure for 
sustainable agricultural development.  
In the second paper, we examine the state regulation of water usage by different sectors 
in Arkansas through the statewide water planning process.  Water allocation, reserved uses, and 
allocation preferences in the State of Arkansas are analyzed.  Regulated riparianism is the water 
allocation arrangement in Arkansas, which treats groundwater as a natural resource that must be 
publicly managed (Dellapenna, 2002).  In considering management strategies for water, both 
surface and groundwater need to be evaluated together because they are commonly interlinked.  
Involvement of multiple agencies in water management creates implementation problems 
because one agency’s actions conflict with those of another.  These conflicts involve public 
policy concerns as well as the interests of the particular parties that may be competing over 




quantity and water quality in the State of Arkansas are defined and explanations for institutional 
challenges in the management of water resources are provided. 
The Arkansas Water Plan (AWP) update process provides opportunities for integrating 
conservation in state water policy, involving exploration of policy issues to determine the role of 
the state in the management of water resources, re-conceptualizing the nature of state policy 
towards water resources.  For complete revision of the AWP, we identify goals and strategies, as 
well as socioeconomic and resource indicators to determine if the state is moving toward 
sustainable water resources, as well as to categorize appropriate management tools.  Analysis of 
public water supply in Arkansas indicated that just a few cities are implementing inclining block 
rates, under which consumers have an incentive to conserve water.  Meantime, the majority of 
analyzed municipalities implement declining block rates, which are regarded as non-
conservation pricing mechanisms.  There is a need for coordination of water utilities to 
implement a conservation-oriented rate structure for different water-use sectors through state 
agencies such as ANRC and Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC). 
In the third paper, we assess the federal-state-local partnership efforts to protect and 
conserve water in the Bayou Meto Basin in Arkansas.  The Bayou Meto Basin is a highly 
productive area for both agriculture and waterfowl.  Located in east central Arkansas, it extends 
from northeast Pulaski County through Lonoke, Prairie, Jefferson, and Arkansas counties.  
Agriculture accounts for most of the economic activity in the Bayou Meto Basin: it traditionally 
generates approximately one-tenth of the six billion dollars in revenues generated statewide by 
the agricultural industry (Popp et al., 2005).  Irrigation is essential for maximum crop production 
in this region.  The Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (also called the Alluvial Aquifer) 




the only other sources are rainfall and runoff captured in on-farm reservoirs, although some 
farmers have access to lagoons and streams.  Crop yields and the agribusiness interests of the 
area that have interest in crop production will be adversely impacted as irrigation declines.  Crop 
yields are lower and much more variable under dry land farming conditions compared with 
irrigated farming.   
The consequences of aquifer depletion can be limited by providing a supplemental source 
of irrigation water, thereby maintaining the aquifer at a level which would allow for a sustained 
yield.  A potential solution to eastern Arkansas’ groundwater problem could be the development 
of alternative water supplies.  The Federal and state governments proposed to construct the 
Bayou Meto Basin project, which includes a system of irrigation canals and pipes to bring 
surface water to farmlands in the area as alternative to groundwater for crop irrigation.  This 
evaluation of the Bayou Meto Project expands upon an economic assessment of the on-farm 
analysis conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE, 2007).  The reassessment of the 
on-farm benefits and costs increased the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) from 1.10 to 1.25 (Wailes and 
Young, 2005).  Implementation of this project is essential to sustain irrigation in parts of the five 
counties that are included in the Bayou Meto Basin.  Continued degradation of wildlife habitat 
will occur without the project.  This research finds that the project can provide economic and 
environmental benefits to sustain irrigated agriculture and wildlife habitat in the project area. 
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Chapter II.   
Common-Pool Resources Management: Needs Assessment for Irrigation Policy Reform in 
the Aral Sea Region 
Kuatbay K. Bektemirov 
University of Arkansas 
Abstract 
This paper explores opportunities for developing policy measures to prevent the collapse 
of the vital irrigation infrastructure in the Aral Sea region by examining agriculture irrigation 
through the lenses of the common-pool resources (CPR) theory.  The study draws on the primary 
data from surveys and socioeconomic information collected in the region, as well as secondary 
sources.  The paper proposes a national program in public sector and private sector cost-sharing 
investment and management for irrigation water supply in Uzbekistan.  Potentially such a 
program can be a win-win situation for both the government and farmers, and can benefit the 
environment by creating incentives to seek better investments in water saving technologies.  
Once assured of proper irrigation system operations resulting in sustainable production levels, 
farmers would assume more responsibility over agriculture and water management.  At the same 
time, government costs could be reduced so it could share the “gains” from water cost-sharing 
with the farmers by adjusting the existing state controlled procurement system.  The paper looks 
at the economic efficiency of various policy options, impacts on the country’s agricultural sector 
and the regulations needed to make the cost-sharing irrigation system viable.  The results define 




based on the need to (i) facilitate the transition from a centrally planned agriculture to a market-
oriented system; (ii) mediate, if not resolve, land tenure and water management issues; and (iii) 
analyze the importance of the irrigation infrastructure for sustainable agricultural development. 
Introduction 
Central Asian economies and their national living standards rely heavily on agriculture.  
Because of the region’s arid climate, agriculture is totally dependent on irrigation.  With a 
population of more than 28 million in 2010, the Republic of Uzbekistan is the most populous 
country in Central Asia.  Total area of Uzbekistan is 448,900 km2, but only about 10% of it is 
arable lands (UzComStat, 2010).  The country withdraws more than 50 km3 of water annually, 
which is about a half of the total water resources available in the Aral Sea basin (Dukhovniy and 
Sokolov, 2003).  While the irrigated acreage appears relatively small within the context of 
overall land utilization, irrigation in fact accounts for 90% of all water use in the country.  
According to the World Bank, the 2010 GDP of Uzbekistan is estimated at US$ 39 billion, of 
which 45.1% is generated in services, 35.4% in industry, and 19.5% in agriculture (World Bank, 
2011).  However, many sectors of the national economy are related to agriculture, and the 
majority of population lives in rural areas and rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. 
The dramatic decline of the Aral Sea is one of the biggest environmental disasters in the 
world, and is often highlighted as a classic case study in the impact of water scarcity (Micklin, 
1988).  The Aral Sea’s decline was the consequence of agricultural expansion in Central Asia, 
which diverted the waters of Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers using the large-scale irrigation 
projects built in 1960-80s.  Uzbekistan was designated as the former USSR’s main cotton 




Uzbekistan became the world’s fifth-largest producer and second-largest exporter of cotton.  
Since its independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has adopted a gradualist state-led development 
approach, in which features of an open-market economy are introduced to the existing command-
administrative economy in a step-by-step manner.  Agricultural lands in Uzbekistan are owned 
by the state, and land plots are leased to farmers for a long term (up to 49 years) or heritable use.  
However, the land tenancy rights can be cancelled if farmers do not fulfill production agreements 
three years in a row (Abdullaev, Fraiture, Giordano, Yakubov, and Rasulov, 2009).  The 
Uzbekistani farm sector produces 3.5-3.7 million metric tons (MT) of unprocessed cotton per 
year, which after ginning yields 1.0-1.2 million MT of raw fiber, and about 80% of that is 
exported.  Chapagain, Hoekstra, Savenije, and Gautam (2005) estimates that each year 
Uzbekistan exports essentially the entire runoff to the Aral Sea basin in the form of the virtual 
water embedded in the cotton trade.  Even if this is an overestimate, the implicit suggestion is 
that a reduction in cotton exports and the production behind them might free some more water to 
supply the Aral Sea. 
The water sector of Uzbekistan consists of 10 Basin Irrigation System Authorities 
(BISAs), a number of large water facilities, pump stations’ cascades, etc.  All water 
organizations are state owned, their operations are financed from national budget through the 
Ministry of Finance and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) 
of Uzbekistan.  Among the budget funds allocated to economic sectors financing of water sector 
takes about 60% without capital investments.  The capital assets of all operational water 
organizations in Uzbekistan are valued at 550,944 million soums (UZS)2, and their aggregate 
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costs are UZS 179,326 million per year (Abaturov and Shadybaev, 2003).  Annual government 
expenses for agriculture amount to more than US$ 258 million, while the water sector financing 
consists of 6–8% of gross spending of the national budget for the economy (USAID, 2005).  
Budget shortages during the period of transformations are making it difficult for the MAWR to 
maintain quality service and continue to invest in the infrastructure development of the irrigation 
system.  According to expert estimates, the water sector is underfunded by 65-70% (USAID, 
2005).  As a result, more than half of irrigated lands have no hydro-melioration (drainage) 
systems, while the depreciation period of existing systems have expired.  Due to the shortage of 
financial resources to maintain the water facilities, the irrigation system has been deteriorating 
and water delivery has become a serious challenge (Abdullaev et al., 2009).  Therefore, the 
government’s role in agriculture, and particularly, in the management of irrigation water, needs 
major policy change. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature.  Section 3 presents the research design and data collection methods.  Section 4 
examines the relative affordability of various policy options in economic terms, demonstrating 
how a particular BISA and the national irrigation system would function.  Section 5 illustrates 
the strategy and institutional arrangements needed to make the system viable. Section 6 provides 
the main conclusions, and Section 7 references. 
Review of the Literature 
This section presents an overview of the literature and analysis of the potential for water 
user participation in irrigation management and more generally of agricultural policies, which 




The Aral Sea desiccation resembles the “Tragedy of the Commons” model described by 
Garret Hardin (1968).  According to Godwin and Shepard (1977), the tragedy of the commons 
presents a dilemma that “results from an incentive structure in which the benefits to an individual 
who increases his use of the resources exceed the costs to him even though the sum of the 
benefits of the action to all users is less than the sum of the costs to all users” (p. 231).  Some 
scholars have claimed that only governments have the ability to regulate effectively common-
pool natural resources and to protect them for all users (Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins, 1998).  
Other scholars have concluded that common property resources require public control if 
economic efficiency is to result from their development.  This scenario provides a context for 
understanding policy problems that involve collectively-owned goods such as irrigation water, 
grazing land, fisheries, and etc.  The policy advice to centralize the control and regulation of 
these kinds of resources had been followed extensively in the former Soviet Union.  In the area 
of irrigation water management, this theory was supported most notably by Karl Wittfogel’s 
“hydraulic state” thesis.  Wittfogel (1957) argued that only “centralized, and indeed despotic 
power, is needed to build and operate large-scale infrastructure” (p. 101). 
Ostrom (1990) contends that CPR, regardless of the size of their infrastructures, are often 
times better operated when they are controlled directly and collectively by the users of the 
resources, rather than by remote, central government bureaucrats.  What is meant by ‘better’ is 
that the resources are allocated more equitably and used more efficiently, and hence the long-
term sustainability of the resource is ensured.  Efficiency of use can be defined in two ways.  
First is the idea that when resource users realize the scarcity of a resource, they voluntarily 
impose rules governing its use.  The users accept the fact that they must contribute in some form 




the minimal amount necessary and thus reduce the amount of their subsequent production costs.  
Second is the idea that when resources are managed directly, operation costs go down.  This is 
because the government, which is regarded as an unnecessary third party, is not present to 
interfere with direct, one-to-one bargaining and negotiation among users.   
The theory that decentralized user management is both more efficient, equitable, and 
cost-effective finds support in many real-world cases over the past twenty years, particularly 
with regard to irrigation management.  International development and donor organizations such 
as the World Bank, UNDP, and USAID have put the theory into practice.  They have worked 
with national governments to enact policies and programs which have shifted control over 
irrigation structures from national water ministries to users.  Countries commonly cited as 
examples of the successful transfer of irrigation water management are diverse and include 
Mexico, the Philippines, Egypt, Pakistan, and Nepal.  The impacts of these management transfers 
are generally regarded as positive, in terms of improved irrigation water efficiencies and equities. 
In Uzbekistan, the agriculture and water resource sectors in general, and irrigation 
management in particular, is the responsibility of national government.  Because the country 
depends on cotton to earn “hard currency”, government uses the “state order” procurement 
system to engage farmers in the cash crop production.  Government subsidizes costs of inter-
farm irrigation and drainage services3 in exchange for cotton and wheat procured at low prices.  
The subsidized water that could be used to grow other profitable crops is provided as a means of 
compensation to farmers for growing cotton.  Under the “state order” system farmers have little 
interest in saving water; therefore, about 70% of water is being lost before it reaches the fields 
through on-farm and inter-farm irrigation systems or is wasted in drainage.  On average, 
                                                          




Uzbekistan’s irrigation system operates at 25-30% efficiency, whereas well-managed irrigation 
systems in arid regions of the world run at about 70% efficiency (Postel, 1996).  The water 
efficiency problems in Uzbekistan are related to its poor management and the resulting impact of 
poor management on the quality of land resources.  Around US$ 2 billion is needed for the 
rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage systems in Uzbekistan (World Bank, 2003).   
The efficient flow of water through an irrigation system to a farmer’s field depends not 
only on the system’s physical structures, but also on economics, institutions and social structures 
that facilitate the construction, operation, and maintenance of the physical structures.  Economic 
theory suggests that water is efficiently used when the incremental benefits generated by another 
unit of water is exactly equal to that unit of water’s incremental cost.  Many articles, books and 
reports are available describing the economic theory of water resources management.4  The basic 
premises of most of these works are (1) that incentives to efficiently manage water resources are 
critical to farmer participation; (2) that institutions affect the way in which and the extent to 
which farmers participate; and (3) that efficient management of large-scale irrigation systems is a 
complex and difficult task, with many alternative approaches.   
The primary factor in efficient water use is the relationship between benefits generated by 
water availability and the costs associated with making the water available.  Most of the 
literature on the economics of water management focuses on the pricing of water.  For example, 
Johansson (2000) states that “…getting the prices right is the…” principal problem in water 
economics (p. 7).  Discussions of setting water prices or tariffs are abundant.  Much of this 
discussion revolves around how to price water – that is, the pricing approaches which could be 
used and how each meets the standards of economic efficiency.  Moreover, water conservation is 
                                                          




an important part of efficient water management, and pricing usually provides users with the 
incentive to conserve water, while subsidies encourage inefficiencies. 
The methodologies used to calculate the water charges are as varied as the prices 
themselves.  Most irrigation water pricing reflects much less than full cost recovery and probably 
less than operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, although the specifics of any case are often 
difficult to determine.  In many countries subsidized agricultural water is viewed as one way to 
assure self-sufficiency (or at least food security in a more limited sense).  It is argued that the 
country’s citizens benefit from irrigated agriculture and therefore government should subsidize 
the water.  Moreover, most countries are, to one degree or another, committed to making farming 
sustainable for rural populations and are, as a consequence, reluctant to charge full cost for large 
scale irrigation development.   
Most economic analyses of water delivery systems distinguish between cost allocation 
and cost sharing.  Cost allocation is the distribution of costs among users in a system in such a 
way that they will pay the total cost (or at least the total O&M costs) of the system.  Cost 
sharing, on the other hand, is the assignment of costs to users without the requirement that total 
cost be assigned.  Therefore, cost sharing refers to water pricing in which only a portion of the 
full cost of the project or service(s) are borne by the user.  The proportion of total costs which are 
covered is variable, and there is no firm “rule” about selecting that proportion.  Moreover, in 
many cost sharing schemes, it appears that agriculture has not been assigned responsibility, not 
even for its “separable” cost,5 which implies that there are significant cross subsidies in the 
pricing (Tsur, Roe, Doukkali, and Dinar, 2004).   
                                                          




In most large-scale irrigation projects around the world, the O&M and replacement costs 
are shared by farmers and the public at large, which is represented by the government.  The 
extent to which farmers bear the burden of these costs depends on many factors, including 
economic and financial characteristics, institutional settings, and operational characteristics of 
the system.  The manner in which costs are “shared” varies from farmer ownership of and 
responsibility for the entire system to fully centralized management (Perry, 1996).  Over the past 
twenty years, increasing costs of system development and maintenance, coupled with 
globalization of competitive markets for agricultural products, have forced governments to look 
to users for increasing financial participation.  Economists often argue that the efficient use of 
resources, including water, is accomplished through this “devolvement” of responsibility. 
Water cost-sharing between users and government is a major feature of irrigation delivery 
in many countries.  In some countries it is implemented through a direct user taxation process, 
the proceeds from which are then transferred to the government central treasury for further 
reallocation to the water delivery authority.  The common trend in recent years in many 
developing countries is to transfer management and operations to users, including costs for 
operations and maintenance and delivery, so that government expenditures can be reduced at the 
same time ensuring that the funds farmers pay are put to direct use.  Ostrom (2005) found that 
trained Water User Associations (WUA) are able to perform many of the O&M functions at 
lower cost and with higher quality than government agencies.  
Research Design and Data Collection 
This research is designed as a structural analysis of agriculture and water sectors, and a 




author for the Uzbekistan water cost-sharing project (USAID, 2005).  In order to introduce water 
charges, the costs associated with making the water available have to be determined.  In theory, 
water charges can be determined using national statistical data on average expenses of the water 
sector.  In conditions of Uzbekistan, the current expenditures for operational water structures 
financed through MAWR could be used for such a calculation.  For example, the total amount of 
operational expenses of water sector divided by the total volume of water supply or by the area 
irrigated land during a year would give us an average cost for water supply in Uzbekistan.  It 
could be used as а uniform tariff on irrigation water delivery per 1 m3 of water or per 1 hectare of 
irrigated area within the country.  However, the national level uniform pricing of water services 
would not take into account sectoral and regional differences, and cannot reflect important 
specific interests of different target groups.  Therefore, in order to make the study feasible, all 
operational water organizations in Uzbekistan are analyzed by classifying them into the 
following five groups: 
1) BISAs, consisting of several Irrigation System Authorities (ISA); 
2) Authorities of large water structures, consisting of reservoirs, barrages, pump station 
cascades, etc., including structures at the Fergana Dispatch Center;  
3) Authorities of Pump Stations and Electrical Communications (PSA); 
4) Viloyat 6 Hydrological Melioration Expeditions (HME), and, 
5) Other organizations, including the Water Inspectorate.  
These water sector organizations have different expenses depending on regional 
circumstances.  According to data compiled for this study, operational expenses for PSA, large 
                                                          




water structures, HME and water enterprises of BISAs vary substantially by regions.  Therefore, 
it would be appropriate to differentiate payments for water by the distinct costs of water delivery 
in various regions of the country.  In order to estimate irrigation charges, the following five 
options of cost sharing between the government and water users are considered: 
1. Payment for operational costs of all water structures by water users, assuming the 
possibility of discontinuation of the state budget financing;  
2. Payment from the state budget for expenditures for machine irrigation operation, i.e. 
operation of pump stations, while all other expenses are covered by water users; 
3. Payment from the state budget for operation of large water structures and land 
reclamation, while all other expenses, including pump stations are paid by users; 
4. Payment by water users for operation of water structures affiliated with BISAs, 
including personnel; while all other organizations to be financed by the state budget; 
5. Payment by water users only for local irrigation systems by which they are served, 
with subsidies from the state budget to cover other water organizations. 
Each of these options has different implications for savings to be created in the state 
budget and for burdens to be imposed on water users.  Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis of these 
water cost-sharing scenarios is undertaken.  In-depth interviews, focus group discussions and a 
national survey are implemented to identify feasible and sustainable policies on irrigation water 













MAWR and local government officials 5 None None 
Farmers 7 2 1 30 
Dehkan 8 farmers 2 1 30 
WUA personnel 2 None None 
Households 9 None 1 60 
Total for each region 11 3 120 
Grand total for 5 regions 55 15 600 
The national survey was conducted in the Fergana, Syrdarya, Samarkand-Bukhara, 
Kashkadarya-Surkhandarya, Khorezm-Karakalpakstan regions of Uzbekistan by a subcontractor 
(USAID, 2005).  Study sites in these regions were defined in consultation with representatives of 
corresponding ISAs and local experts taking into account the peculiarities of rural farms’ 
operating conditions.  Survey respondents were classified in accordance with their target group 
affiliation and location of their land plots along irrigation canals.  The respondent selection was 
performed using the probability procedure, - to be able to represent farms located in upstream, 
midstream, and tail-end areas of an irrigation system.  The survey was designed as a 
willingness/ability to pay exercise.  In addition to general socio-economic information regarding 
farmstead incomes and agricultural production values, the questionnaires determined stakeholder 
                                                          
7  A farm operator registered with local authorities as a farmer and a user of a land plot leased for 
a long term or heritable use, having the rights to hire workers, and having a bank account. 
8  A family-based farm operating a land plot leased for a long-term use, having a bank account, 
but having no rights to hire workers, and for whom registration with local authorities is not 
required. 
9  A family or group of individuals registered with local authorities as users of inheritable land 
plots.  The members are united under three ‘K’s – ‘krysha’ (roof) - common ownership, ‘kazan’ 





attitudes towards agricultural production costs, irrigation and drainage cost-sharing, perceptions 
of fee collection mechanisms, water availability/scarcity and concerns for the environment, etc. 
Results and Discussion 
In order to determine potential savings in the national budget attributable to introducing 
water charges, calculations are made for each policy option of reimbursement regarding the 
water sector enterprises’ operational expenses by agricultural producers (Figure 1).  Although 
these calculations are based on USAID (2005) data, given the gradualist approach and stability 
of economic trends in Uzbekistan, this paper assumes that the data is still a valid estimator of the 
water sector’s current financial parameters.  Option #1 would discontinue budget financing to 
water sector at all, while options # 2 and #3 would generate almost equal budget savings.  Option 
#4 would save about 15% of the budget, and savings associated with option #5 are nominal. 
Figure 1.  Proportions of state budget and water user cost-sharing options 
 
Figure 1 indicates that the better the government budget savings are in a particular option, 




option that represents optimal trade-off supporting two objectives -- generating budget savings 
and not imposing too high a cost on water users.  However, not all of the listed options meet 
these goals of water cost sharing.  Calculations confirm that options #1 and #3 would 
considerably increase production costs and decrease revenues of agricultural producers in many 
regions.  Although option #5 can be used at the initial stage of reforms, it would not generate 
sufficient effect on reduction of the state budget expenses.  Since options #2 and #4 have almost 
equal effect in terms budget savings, only these options are considered for further analysis. 
As it was mentioned already, operational expenses for pumped irrigation, large water 
structures, land reclamation services on irrigation lands and BISA enterprises vary substantially 
in Uzbekistan.  Therefore, payments for water should be differentiated by the distinct costs of 
water delivery in various areas of the country.  All the operational water organizations, such as 
the enterprises managed by a BISA itself, viloyat level PSA, HME and large water facilities, are 
classified as separate groups within every BISA area.  Table 2 presents the resulting differences 
of five cost-sharing policy options in one BISA area, while Table 4 illustrates the tariff variations 
among all BISAs under a selected option analysis, based on information received by the author 
from water and statistical organizations in the region.  The service area of Lower-Syrdarya BISA 
is located in the middle part of country.  Cost of water delivery in this area and the proportion of 
costs that would be borne by water users and state budget differ under different scenarios (Table 
2).  Water unit cost and water user cost sharing are in descending order from options #1 through 
#5.  Under option #4, this BISA has a unit price of 0.77 UZS/m3 which would generate a 24.6% 
share of the total water cost of UZS 12.6 billion within the BISA boundaries.  By contrast, option 
#2 has a unit price and cost share (2.39% and 76.6% respectively) that is three times more than 











000' ha 000' m³ 000' UZS UZS/ha UZS/m³ Users, % State, %
1
Operations of all 
water enterprises in 
the area 
515.1 4,054,200 12,635,953 24,532.12 3.12 100.00 0.00
2




515.1 4,054,200 9,680,359 18,793.97 2.39 76.61 23.39
3





515.1 4,054,200 6,063,920 11,772.82 1.50 47.99 52.01
4
Operations of all 
enterprises under the 
BISA
515.1 4,054,200 3,108,326 6,034.67 0.77 24.60 75.40
Operations "Shuruzak-
Syrdarya" ISA
108.5 1,148,700 421,676 3,884.91 0.37 3.34 96.66
Operations "Uchtom" 
ISA 
166.3 1,136,500 256,922 1,545.37 0.23 2.03 97.97
Operations "Havas-
Zamin" ISA 
99.8 695,900 419,315 4,201.64 0.60 3.32 96.68
Operations "Bayaut-
Arnasay" ISA 
140.5 1,073,100 254,573 1,812.10 0.24 2.01 97.99
Group Classification
Unit cost of water Cost sharing
Option
5
Source: USAID (2005). 
The unit costs presented in Table 2 reflect only the primary cost of water delivery.  In 
order to derive unit costs that more fully reflect true resource costs -- estimates of profit, 
insurance and depreciation must be incorporated.  The results from this adjustment are given in 
the following Table 3.  Under option #4, the full unit cost would be 1.39 UZS/m3 rather than 0.77 
UZS/m3.  This higher figure would be the charge we recommend for the Lower-Syrdarya BISA 




Many aspects of the potential introduction of water cost sharing and of appropriate forms 
of tariffs were the topic of focus group discussions with specialists from the BISA, ISA, 
OHGME, PSA, and WUA, and authorities of MAWR in corresponding regions.  They provided 
important feedback on the prospective concerns that may arise with the introduction of a water 
cost sharing program in Uzbekistan.  For example, the concept of calculating tariffs for water 
delivery services on the basis of operational costs of the irrigation system received support from 
many representatives from both the irrigation and the agricultural sectors.  Local specialists in 
irrigation also confirmed the necessity of taking estimates of normative profits, assessments for 
insurance funds and amortization into account when constructing a cost basis for tariffs. 
Table 3.  Water charges in Lower-Syrdarya BISA under options #2 and #4 
UZS/ha UZS/m³ UZS/ha UZS/m³
 Prime cost of water delivery 18,793.97 2.39 6,034.67 0.77
 Normative profit * 4,698.49 0.60 1,508.67 0.19
 Capital investment depreciation ** 4,337.22 0.55 2,774.88 0.35
 Insurance fund *** 1,879.40 0.24 603.47 0.08
 Full charge for water delivery 29,709.07 3.77 10,921.69 1.39
Parameters
Option #2 Option #4
 
Source: USAID (2005). 
*Normative profit is calculated as 25% of the prime cost (Melioratcja i Vodnoe 
Khozjaystvo, 1984). 
**Capital depreciation is calculated at 6% of long term assets balance-value (Ibid). 
***Insurance fund allocations are calculated as 10% of the prime cost. 
Although these calculations hold true under the presence of state order for cotton and 
wheat, there may be very good reasons for revising this procurement system to help agricultural 
producers to adjust to the new water pricing policy.  Currently farmers have not been paid what it 
costs them in terms of their labor to cultivate the state order crops, but they in turn have not been 
charged the “true cost” of the irrigation water.10  In reality, water costs a lot of money to water 
                                                          
10  The cost that is paid by society in general, either through government subsidy/support 




users.  The majority of farmers have large sums of accounts payable, limiting their cash on hand 
and ability to pay.  Some farmers incur huge costs to access irrigation water, such as the cost of 
electricity to pump water, the cost of laying new canals towards farmers’ land plots, the cost of 
fixing irrigation systems near their farms.  While irrigation water delivery at the system level is 
free of charge, WUA, who distribute water at the farm level must charge for their services in 
order to generate operating funds.  The fixed low prices at which cotton and wheat are procured 
simply do not leave enough money with farmers to pay for WUA services and, as a result, many 
of WUAs are unable to pay for operations and maintenance and are in effect non-operational 
(Djalalov, 2004).  Therefore, farmers’ profit base needs to be increased slightly by increasing the 
government purchase prices in the state order system by at least 5-6%.  This level is high enough 
to cover the increased costs associated with higher payments for water delivery.  
According to Abdullaev et al. (2009), reforms which increase the profitability of farming 
and reward farmers for efficiency are likely to lead to additional investments in both land and 
water management.  In turn, these will lead to higher yields through better management 
practices, higher levels of input use and thus higher levels of water use and increased water 
productivity.  However, it is also possible that improved management can reduce overall water 
use, even in the face of higher crop output, by improving the way water is applied and recycled, 
or through better plant varieties.  This paper assumes that the reform under proposed scenario 
would not lead to higher water use because the area and output will remain relatively unchanged, 
and the survey respondents are told that water use will not increase.  Moreover, it will probably 
create incentives for water users to seek better alternatives for water use, invest in water saving 









Tariff share in 
production costs 
Tariff share in 
revenue 
Amu-Bukhara 7,101.5 0.81 1.54% 1.29% 
Amu-Kashkadarya 8,076.9 0.90 4.14% 3.29% 
Amu-Surkhan 10,447.3 0.78 2.14% 1.78% 
Lower-Amudarya 11,518.9 0.88 5.50% 10.17% 
Lower-Syrdarya 10,921.7 1.39 7.68% 6.10% 
Naryn-Karadarya 16,902.1 2.12 6.58% 3.71% 
Naryn-Syrdarya 15,917.5 1.69 7.91% 5.33% 
Syrdarya-Sokh 7,333.2 0.79 2.77% 2.35% 
Zaravshan 13,355.2 1.29 7.24% 5.73% 
Uzbekistan average 11,286.0 1.18 5.06% 4.42% 
Source: USAID (2005). 
In order to assess the impact of the water pricing options on the economic conditions of 
agricultural producers in various regions of Uzbekistan, proportions of new water tariffs in the 
production costs and revenue are estimated under the considered two policy scenarios.  A 
benchmark of 5-6% “permissible level” (Perry, 1996) used for developing countries is adopted 
for these comparisons.  With exception of some areas, the burden of costs to be borne by water 
users under option #4 stays within the “permissible level”.  This is less often the case with the 
burden of costs estimated under option #2, and these tariffs are not shown here due to space 
limitation.  Given these results, option #4 is recommended as the basis for the initial design of a 
water pricing framework in Uzbekistan (Table 4).  Nevertheless, for some farmers located in the 




yields are caused by environmental factors of the Aral Sea disaster, it will be necessary to 
subsidize water costs.  At the outset of this new policy, it makes sense to use some of the funds 
meant originally for the operational costs of BISA to serve as an interim source of financing 
selected subsidies. 
Implementation Strategy 
Using financial instruments, such as tariffs for water delivery would encourage all water 
users to reduce their water demand.  At the same time, “governance” would encourage to use 
social instruments – traditional methods of economically sound water use, and public 
participation in decision-making (Ostrom, 1990).  These and other factors should be taken into 
consideration for establishing rules of game.  This section sheds light on desirable features to be 
included in the policy design and implementation structures in Uzbekistan.  These relate to 
assigning a new role to BISAs, new tariff structure, and payment mechanisms.   
As Uzbekistan moves toward a market-oriented economy, the participation of 
stakeholders in irrigation system management is desired.  Transfer from MAWR to stakeholders 
of managerial and operational cost bearing for major sections of the irrigation system would 
represent a bold step toward the participatory management of irrigation systems.  There is the 
need for a national program in public sector and private sector cost-sharing investment and 
management for irrigation water supply in Uzbekistan.  Potentially such a program can create a 
win-win situation for both government and farmers, and benefit the Aral Sea by creating 
incentives to seek better investments in water-saving technologies.  Once assured of proper 
system operations resulting in sustainable production levels, farmers would assume more direct 




reduced so it could share the “gains” from water cost-sharing with the farmers by adjusting the 
state-controlled procurement system for agricultural products. 
The new role of BISAs derives extensively from the assumption that they might be 
transformed into enterprises that are managed on a paying basis, functioning on principles of 
self-reliance based on payments received from water users for water delivered.  However, the 
national budget financing should be continued to HME, PSA, large water facilities of main 
systems and water reservoirs.  It is because of the public goods nature of their services, also in 
order to prevent excessive growth in the tariffs for agricultural producers at the initial stage.  In 
subsequent stages of the introducing of water cost-sharing policy these costs also might be 
shifted to water users, starting from HME.  
With regard to tariff structure, greater economic efficiency is possible with the 
establishment of tariffs customized to the cost structure of specific BISAs.  A single tariff should 
be applied to water supply services within the boundaries of a given BISA.  In this analysis, 
option #4 makes that assumption (as do options #1 through #3).  Tariffs must be the same for the 
vegetation and inter-vegetation periods as well as across producers of different crops. 
From the agriculture and irrigation sector perspectives, the preference of using volumetric 
and per-hectare tariffs may be different.  Farmers may prefer the volumetric based calculations 
of tariffs while irrigators may favor the per-hectare tariffs.  A combination of both approaches 
should be applied during the initial implementation of the water cost-sharing policy (such as 25% 
of tariffs on a volumetric basis and 75% on an area basis).  However, ultimately, the volumetric 
approach should prevail over the per-hectare approach since the former is the most efficient 




availability during different years, the current condition of the irrigation network, as well as the 
availability of water metering devices at various system levels.  
Although the water cost-sharing can be economically feasible, there are feasibility issues 
related to how the new system would actually work.  We propose the following payment scheme 
for irrigation water delivery from BISA through farmers under the new water policy (Figure 2): 









According to proposed scheme in Figure 2, a farmer would transfer payments to the 
WUA account.  The WUA may deduct a charge from this payment in order to pay for the 
services it provides.  The remainder of the funds should be transmitted to the ISA in accordance 
with the received volume of water.  The ISA may function as a regional subdivision of its 
respective BISA or it may stay a self-reliant enterprise, running on a pay-as-you-go basis.  In this 
case, the ISA will set aside funds to maintain the costs of the BISA as its supervisory entity.  The 
BISA will pay funds to the state budget from its proceeds.  HME, PSA, MAWR and other 
personnel will be paid from the state budget.  Finally, taking into consideration the current 
problems with payments, a possible mechanism for the processing of payments for water could 
be created by tapping into the existing system of agricultural credit, which currently maintains 





The findings reported in this paper support the cost-sharing program for the reform of 
agriculture and water policies in Uzbekistan.  Water cost-sharing between users and government 
is being introduced step-by-step through formation of networks of WUAs in different parts of 
country.  Government has adapted the Welfare Improvement Strategy of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan for the period of 2008-2012, one of the objectives of which is “improving the system 
and increasing the efficiency of water resource management including investment in land 
improvement” and “development of an integrated sustainable water management system for 
supply of irrigation water” (IMF, 2008).  Implementation of water cost-sharing activity will be a 
major turning point for this process to take hold at the grass-roots level in Uzbekistan. 
Sharing the costs of delivering irrigation water has potential advantages and dis-
advantages.  Cost-sharing might improve the allocative efficiency of water resources by sending 
economic signals to users and suppliers alike about the value of water and the quantities needed.  
It will create incentives to seek better alternatives, invest in water saving technologies and make 
capital investments where needed.  However, cost sharing has its potential drawbacks.  
Agricultural producers will be paying higher prices than they currently pay for water.  This 
compounds the problem that producers are already experiencing challenges in managing their 
cash flows.  The increased costs to water users could be offset by reforming of the state order 
procurement system or by selective subsidies.  Under the proposed water cost-sharing scenario, 
WUAs would be supported by water users, and BISAs would become self-sustaining, receiving 
funds from their respective ISAs, which in turn, would have been paid by their WUAs. 
In order to make the proposed program feasible, the existing institutions should be 




make the system viable, including the law on WUA and normative documents needed to 
empower WUAs.  It must be realized that the systemic change cannot be made in a piecemeal 
approach.  For example, WUAs cannot become viable without a “package” of institutional 
changes that would free up farmers and increase their profitability.  Cost-sharing of the water 
system is only a part of the strategy to give operational freedom to farmers; other aspects, such as 
agricultural production and markets also must be included.  
The expected outcome of the program would be the social welfare enhancing due to 
efficient allocation of resources between water users and the government.  The program impacts 
can be estimated as a reduction in MAWR costs, enhanced financial self-reliance of BISA, 
expansion of WUA service areas, greater irrigation water efficiency, higher quality technical 
services to water users, and increase in crop intensity and yields.  In exchange for higher water 
delivery prices, water users would receive better service and achieve better output.  At the same 
time, adjustments in the state order procurement pricing would ease the loss of economic 
efficiency and thus government share the “gains” from water cost-sharing with the agricultural 
producers.  Therefore, the transfer from the government agencies to stakeholders of operational 
cost bearing for the irrigation infrastructure in Uzbekistan would be advancement toward the 
participatory management of the common-pool resources in the Aral Sea region.  
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Integrating Conservation in Arkansas State Water Policy 
Kuatbay Bektemirov and Eric J. Wailes 
Introduction 
There are abundant water resources in the State of Arkansas consisting of rivers, lakes, 
reservoirs, wetlands, and aquifers.  A 30-year annual rainfall in the state ranges between 813 and 
1,981 mm (32 and 78 in).  According to the Arkansas Geological Survey, the average daily flow 
of 5 major river systems (White River, Arkansas River, Ouachita River, Red River, and the 
Mississippi River) and other streams in Arkansas totals approximately 1.06 km3 (280 billion gal) 
(AGS, 2011).  Also, there are numerous reservoirs with total storage capacity of about 18.93 km3 
(5 trillion gal) of water, and 12 major aquifers are used for water supply in Arkansas.  The largest 
groundwater sources are the Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (Alluvial Aquifer) 
located in eastern Arkansas and the Sparta/Memphis Sand Aquifer (Sparta Aquifer) located in 
eastern and southern Arkansas. 
The main water resource issues in Arkansas include increased water demand in 
agricultural, municipal, and mining sectors; increased numbers of water shortages in many parts 
of the state; and declining water tables and lower stream flows (USACE, 2009).  Water 
withdrawals in Arkansas increased by 60% since 1980 and have reached 0.043 km3 d-1 (11.4 
billion gal day-1), of which 0.028 km3 (7.5 billion gal) is groundwater (Holland, 2007).  
Sustainability of groundwater withdrawal ranges between 40% and 50%, depending on the 




According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2007), the Alluvial Aquifer can supply 
groundwater up to 0.01 km3 d-1 (2.7 billion gal day-1) north of the Arkansas River and 0.002 km3 
d-1 (526 million gal day-1) south of the Arkansas River, while the Sparta Aquifer can supply only 
0.0003 km3 d-1 (89 million gal day-1).  Approximately 0.032 km3 d-1 (8.5 billion gal day-1) or 
90% of consumptive water use is attributed to irrigated agriculture, the majority of which comes 
from aquifers.  Hydro- and thermoelectric power generation use 0.235 and 0.008 km3 d-1 (62 and 
2 billion gal day-1) of water, respectively.  However, after usage, these waters return back to the 
rivers and lakes; therefore, we do not include them in our calculation of the proportions of total 
water use by sectors in Arkansas (Figure 1). 

















Water Allocation, Reserved Uses, and Allocation Preferences 
If there is water shortage in any stream to meet requirements of all water needs, water can 
be allocated among the competing uses so that each use obtains an equitable portion of the 
amount of water available.  However, the following reserved uses are excluded from the amount 
available for allocation: domestic and municipal-domestic, minimum streamflow, and federal 
water rights.  Domestic and municipal-domestic water uses include ordinary household purposes 
including human consumption, washing, the watering of domestic livestock, poultry and animals 
and the watering of home gardens, and fire protection.  Minimum streamflow refers to the water 
necessary to support aquifer recharge, fish and wildlife, interstate compacts, navigation, and 
water quality.  Federal water rights are considered as “there may be some water over which the 
United States has a preemptive right that is superior to rights of others” (ASWCC, 1990). 
Arkansas is a member of two interstate compacts—the Red River Compact with Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Louisiana and the Arkansas River Compact with Oklahoma.  Use of the Arkansas 
River watercourse for navigation purposes is authorized by the U.S. Congress (ASWCC, 1990). 
The remaining water can be allocated in the following order of preference: (1) agriculture, (2) 
industry, (3) hydropower, and (4) recreation (ASWCC, 1990).  It should be noted that this order 
holds for both riparian and non-riparian uses, with riparian diversions having priority.  
Legislative Framework 
Water laws in Arkansas, like in many other eastern states, are based on the riparian rights 
doctrine.  The basic principle of the riparian doctrine is that landowners who own property next 
to a stream, or land over any groundwater, have the right to free and reasonable use of the water, 




regulatory processes of planning, management, and allocation are known as “regulated 
riparianism.”  The Arkansas system is typified as regulated riparianism because “the 
administrative permit process proceeds on essentially riparian principles and that the system is a 
regulation of—rather than a taking of—riparian rights” (Dellapenna, 2002). 
A number statutes and regulations serve as milestones of the regulated riparian system in 
Arkansas.  The Act 81 of 1957 initiated annual registration of surface water diversion, while Act 
1051 of 1985 instituted annual registration of groundwater withdrawals over 189,270 L d-1 
(50,000 gal day-1) (ANRC, 2011a).  State laws enacted in 1991, 1999, and 2004 address the 
aquifers in southern and eastern Arkansas.  According to Act 1426 of 2001, any well 
withdrawing groundwater from a sustaining aquifer shall have a properly functioning metering 
device (Arkansas State Legislature, 2001).  The aquifers affected are nine “sustaining aquifers,” 
including the Sparta Aquifer; however, the Alluvial Aquifer is not affected since it is not 
considered a “sustaining aquifer.”  Domestic wells are exempt (ANRC, 2011b).  The 1995 Act 
341 on Water Resources Conservation and Development Incentives provides income tax credits 
for construction of water impoundments with capacity of over 24,667 m3 (20 ac-ft.) for projects 
that convert groundwater use to surface water use, and for the leveling of agricultural lands in 
order to conserve irrigation water (ANRC, 2011c). 
Institutional Framework 
In Arkansas, management responsibilities for sustaining water quantity and water quality 
are apportioned among several agencies.  The Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) 
has primary responsibility for water quantity, while the Arkansas Department of Environmental 




Natural Heritage Commission, Game and Fish Commission, Forestry Commission, and Public 
Service Commission) include water resources management as part of their mission.  Federal 
agencies with interests in Arkansas water resources include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and United States 
Geological Survey (USGS).  Local institutions include county-based conservation districts; 
regional water-distribution districts; irrigation, drainage, and watershed improvement districts; 
levee districts; etc.  Such a variety of institutions can create coordination problems because one 
agency’s actions may conflict with those of another.  
Critical Groundwater Areas 
Arkansas Groundwater Protection and Management Act of 1991 enables designation of 
critical groundwater use areas (CGWAs).  This establishes the authority for groundwater 
withdrawals, groundwater rights, fees, and a mechanism for local groundwater management. 
Criteria for the designation of CGWA status include the following:  
• Less than 50% of the saturated thickness in unconfined aquifer formation (Alluvial) 
or potentiometric surface below the top of the confined aquifer formation (Sparta) 
• Average annual decline of groundwater level is one foot or more for the preceding 
five years 
• Degradation of groundwater quality that would render the water unusable as a 
drinking water source (ASWCC, 1990)  
CGWA designation brings about enhanced tax credits for conservation activities and 
educational programs and makes it possible to obtain federal programs and funding.  Currently, 




Arkansas counties (Bradley, Calhoun, Columbia, Ouachita, and Union) was designated in 1996.  
The Sparta aquifer water levels in these counties had dropped below the critical level, but the 
situation was worst in Union County.  Therefore, Union County officials with county 
stakeholders supported legislation that authorized formation of the Union County Water 
Conservation Board in 1999.  The Sparta Aquifer Critical Groundwater Counties’ Remediation 
Act authorizes the board to levy a water conservation fee in the amount up to 96 cents per 3.79 
m3 (1,000 gal) of aquifer water withdrawn to discourage the withdrawal of aquifer water by 
water users.  A water user may be assessed a conservation fee determined by the board until the 
water user connects to an alternate water source provided by the board to the property line of a 
water user (Johnson, 2006).  The money raised from the conservation fee, coupled with revenue 
from a temporary county sales tax and private contributions, funded 90% of the planning, design, 
and construction of a $65 million project to provide water from the Ouachita River to the three 
largest industrial users of groundwater in the Union County.  Because the three industries now 
use the alternative surface water from the Ouachita River, the Sparta Aquifer is recovering; 
groundwater levels are rising and threats to drinking water quality appear to have been halted 
(Johnson, 2006).  However, other users of Sparta Aquifer outside of this CGWA project area are 
still experiencing significant water level declines. 
The Grand Prairie CGWA was designated in 1998 to prevent declines of the Alluvial and 
Sparta aquifers water levels in six southeast Arkansas counties (Arkansas, Jefferson, Lonoke, 
Prairie, Pulaski, and White).  The Cache CGWA, designated in 2009, includes the Alluvial and 
Sparta aquifers in seven counties (Clay, Craighead, Cross, Greene, Lee, Poinsett, and St. Francis) 
west of Crowley’s Ridge in eastern Arkansas.  However, sampling data from these areas show 




state is that groundwater levels are declining due to continued withdrawals at rates that are not 
sustainable (ANRC, 2011d). 
State Water Planning 
Planning for water resources has been done in many states, although their approaches 
vary depending on local circumstances.  The initial development of the Arkansas Water Plan 
dates back to 1975, when Arkansas was considered a water-rich state.  Updates were made to the 
Arkansas Water Plan between 1986 and 1989; however, the state water policy framework still 
remains under the perception of water-resource abundance.  This 25-year old document cannot 
adequately address current water concerns driven by population growth, climate change, 
irrigation, natural gas fracturing, and other recent developments in Arkansas.  Balancing 
demands for water volume while maintaining water quality to support a prosperous population 
and continued economic growth requires active management of the state’s water resources.  An 
appropriate update of the state water policy, authority, and infrastructure should be in place to 
effectively manage water resources to meet contemporary challenges in Arkansas.  
A new Arkansas water plan should identify explicit goals and strategies, socioeconomic 
indicators, and water indicators to determine if the state is moving toward sustainable water 
resources.  Several states, including the neighboring states of Texas and Oklahoma, have 
developed indicators that possibly could be modified and adapted for Arkansas.  An update to the 
Arkansas water plan will need to involve an exploration of policy issues to determine the role of 
the state in the management of resources and to identify what management tools are needed.  In 




allow citizens to express their needs and concerns and to convince the public of the need to make 
changes to the existing laws and mechanisms of state water resource planning and management. 
Incorporating Conservation into Water Policy 
The importance of the conservation of waters in maintaining adequate water supplies to 
meet the state’s water requirements is recognized in Arkansas.  Conservation plans are required 
to be developed and implemented by water diverters as a part of the allocation plan (ASWCC, 
1990).  Water conservation measures need to be implemented as an alternative to water 
development projects to meet future demands, rather than being a part of the allocation plan 
during the water shortage times only.  Conservation principles can be incorporated into the 
Arkansas Water Plan to meet water needs in all areas of the state.  Meeting water conservation 
criteria should be a condition of eligibility for ANRC programs; it should be encouraged by 
providing education about current methods and technical assistance from ANRC and 
conservation districts.  Water conservation plans should include conservation goals, benchmarks, 
and best management guidelines for water use sectors. 
Water scarcity may be mitigated by either increasing the water supply or decreasing the 
demand for water.  Water demand can be manipulated by price to some degree.  The range for 
price elasticity of residential demand is between -0.30 and -0.40, meaning a 10% increase in 
price lowers demand by 3% to 4% (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009).  However, it should be noted 
that within the residential demand, water for necessities such as sanitation, cleaning, and cooking 
is less responsive to price than water for more discretionary uses such as lawn watering, car 
washing, and swimming pools.  While the price elasticity of industrial demand could vary from -




(Rosegrant et al., 2002).  A comprehensive state plan can encourage conservation or restrict use 
to a level that conserves the resource.  During times of shortage, the plan should allow allocation 
of available water resources to the highest valued uses from the society’s point of view.  
Economic incentives can decrease water use so additional water resources do not need to 
be developed.  A number of states provide tax credits to residential or commercial users who 
install water-conservation equipment.  Federal agencies pay individuals and organizations to 
protect water resources under some programs and projects.  However, in Arkansas, income tax 
credits can be provided mostly to the projects that convert groundwater use to surface water use.  
In Arkansas, 1,089 farms with 809,371 ha (2 million ac) of land received payments for irrigation 
improvements from USDA programs, while only 130 farms with 62,171 ha (153,628 ac) of land 
received payments from state, local, or district programs (USDA-NASS, 2010). 
Demand for water is driven by many variables, including water-intensive industries, 
irrigated crops, and implementation of water-saving technologies.  Arkansas’ water-intensive 
crops are among the nation’s key agricultural products.  For example, with more than 526 
thousand ha (1.3 million ac) harvested area in 2008, the state was the leading producer of rice in 
the nation and ranked second in cotton with its share of 16.6% of national production (USDA-
NASS 2010).  The single largest user of irrigation water is rice, followed by cotton, corn, and 
soybeans.  Rice is cultivated mainly in the Mississippi River Delta and consumes about 55% of 
the total water for these four crops in the state.  We estimate average annual water use for rice 
production in Arkansas from 2005 to 2009 to be about 3.4 km3 (2.8 million ac-ft.), which costs 
producers around US$96 million annually.  Soybeans are the second largest agricultural water 
user in the state, accounting for 26% of the water use by these four crops and estimated irrigation 




and labor costs and is an average for flood irrigation over different soil types, based on the 
University of Arkansas Cooperative Extension Service data (UACES, 2009).  
In 2008 only 25 Arkansas’ farms have transferred more than 0.02 km3 (17,500 ac-ft.) of 
water to municipal or industrial users by renting or leasing on-farm wells (USDA-NASS, 2010).  
Arkansas can move toward the efficient transfer of water from areas with a surplus to areas with 
a shortage by adopting new criteria for prioritizing water use.  The new criteria should encourage 
use of economic tools such as water trading and water markets for cost-effective redistribution of 
water from areas or uses with surplus to those experiencing water shortage.  
Public Water Supply Rate Structures 
Water is “priceless” because of its importance to human survival; however, in Arkansas it 
is literally so because of the existing state water law.  The applicants can be required to contract 
for the transportation of specified quantity of water at a reasonable price to users within the 
immediate vicinity of the proposed route of transportation.  The term “reasonable price” means 
only the cost of transportation of the water, not the water itself (ASWCC, 1990).  State law 
requires any utility “charges, rates, etc., to be just, reasonable, and in compliance with Acts 1919, 
No. 571, and Acts 1921, No. 124” (A.C.A. 2011).  Although the Arkansas Public Service 
Commission (APSC) is empowered to find and fix just, reasonable, and sufficient rates to be 
thereafter observed, enforced, and demanded by any public utility, this agency regulates only a 
few private utilities selling water to the public (APSC, 2011).  Analysis of data from 18 
Arkansas’ cities indicates that municipal water rate structure is heterogeneous.  Inclining block 
rates, under which consumers have incentive to conserve water, are being implemented in four 




20,000 are implementing uniform block rates (conservation neutral).  Ten cities implement 
declining block rates, which are regarded as non-conservation pricing mechanisms.  
Water Use in Natural Gas Mining 
As of March 4, 2011, there were 12,449 natural gas wells in the State of Arkansas, 4,089 
of them located in the Fayetteville Shale Play, with 3,478 being in the status of active wells 
(AOGC, 2011).  Production of natural gas in economic quantity can be stimulated by hydraulic 
fracturing, i.e. pumping fluid consisting of a large amount of water and chemicals into gas wells.  
A well may be fractured in as many as eight stages, and each fracturing effort requires 
approximately 8 thousand m³ (2.1 million gal) of water (Arthur et al., 2008).  Water for 
fracturing is typically drawn from surface water storage designed for the purpose, also purchased 
from landowners with private lakes, ponds, stock tanks or holders of riparian rights at negotiated 
prices.  This demand for water in most cases requires non-riparian permits because of the 
location of gas wells.  As of March 3, 2010, ANRC received 726 non-riparian permit 
applications from gas companies, which is a huge increase compared to 16 permits issued 
between 1985 and 2007 for non-riparian municipal, agricultural and industrial water use (ANRC, 
2011a).  Despite that the disposal of used water is regulated by the AOGC and ADEQ, this water 
use should be considered as a consumptive use.  Water availability and the consequent disposal 
of wastes are emerging concerns, along with potential impairment of water quality in Arkansas.  
While fracturing uses a relatively small amount of available water in the Fayetteville Shale area, 
the combined effect of agriculture irrigation, municipal supply, and natural gas mining could be 
significant in Arkansas.  Therefore, the new water needs from the natural gas production in 





Arkansas water resource challenges limit economic potential of the state and the 
livelihoods of its population.  State water policy should be consistent to water use opportunities.  
Water management should incorporate resource conservation into planning to balance demand 
for water and to minimize the development of shortages.  A comprehensive system of water 
planning can restrict water use to a level that conserves the resource.  The state should be able to 
allocate available water not only during times of shortage, but designate water resources to the 
highest valued uses from society’s point of view. 
Agricultural water users should be actively encouraged to use the most efficient, feasible 
irrigation practices (e.g. conservation tillage) and on-farm surface water infrastructure to store 
and recycle water.  Economically efficient water conservation techniques should be promoted 
across the state.  Water conserving research and extension services should be expanded with an 
emphasis on healthy rivers, lakes, and aquifers using sustainable in-stream flows.  
The State water planning process should be clearly defined, transparent, accountable, and 
include the public and all stakeholder groups.  Currently, policy decision of water pricing is done 
at the municipal level, which is different from city to city.  There is a need for coordination of 
water utilities to implement a conservation-oriented rate structure for different water-use sectors 
through state agencies such as ANRC and APSC.  Also, rapidly increased water use for natural 
gas drilling in the Fayetteville Shale should be reflected in state water policy. 
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Integrated Assessment of Welfare and Distributional Effects of the Bayou Meto Basin 
Project in Arkansas 
Abstract 
This study examined Bayou Meto Basin, Arkansas project to analyze the benefits and 
costs of regional development.  It seeks to assess the economic and distributional effects of the 
project, which designed to protect the environment and ensure water to sustain irrigated 
agriculture in the region on different stakeholder groups.  Kaldor-Hicks tableau is an effective 
tool used to analyze distributional effects and explore the outcomes of policy in terms of benefits 
and costs.  The results showed that some stakeholders in the project would “win”, meantime the 
others would incur some “loss” in the result of project.  The regional sustainable development 
will need the project’s integrated water management approach, which in turn demands the 
integration of the efforts of all stakeholders; participation of all stakeholders, particularly the 
beneficiaries; and economic and financial stability to account for costs of withdrawing, 
delivering and opportunity costs of water, including costs associated with economic and 
environmental externalities.  In addition, the findings exposed the limited stakeholder 
collaborations, the absence of a plan to mitigate water insecurity and lack of proactive strategies 
to address the impact of new challenges such as climate change. 






Groundwater in eastern Arkansas represents one of the most valuable common-pool 
resources in the state.  The primary water use of these resources is for agriculture, with crop 
irrigation accounting for 92 percent of water used in 2010 (USGS, 2014).  The Mississippi River 
Valley Alluvial Aquifer (also called the Alluvial Aquifer) is the principal source of ground water 
for irrigation in the region.  However, the Alluvial Aquifer is seriously depleted because of 
pumping rates that are much greater than the rate of recharge (ANRC, 2015).  Some farmers 
have tapped the Sparta Aquifer as well, which is a low yielding, deep and high-quality source of 
water that is better suited for municipal and industrial use.  These withdrawals are depleting the 
aquifers so they will no longer be viable sources of water by 2027 (USACE, 2007). 
According to Ostrom (1990), groundwater sources are characterized as a common pool 
resource that can be accessed by multiple users who may ignore the future social and economic 
costs of resource depletion.  It is individually rational for competitive users to deplete the 
groundwater resources as their marginal benefit equals the unit extraction cost, i.e. each user 
ignores the effect of individual extraction on other users.  Common pool systems may prevent 
competitive markets from attaining optimal resource use and justify government intervention or 
other forms of collective action. 
One of the important approaches to address the groundwater depletion in Eastern 
Arkansas has been surface water projects coordinated by the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps).  Two important projects are the Grand Prairie Demonstration Project and the 
Bayou Meto Basin Project.  These projects have multipurpose objectives but both include 
supplementation of surface water from major rivers in the region for crop irrigation.  The 




overview of the governance framework and the role of the Bayou Meto Basin project.  It 
examines the extent to which government intervention reflects stakeholder group perspectives 
and articulates strategies to achieve common pool resource sustainability.  Then it outlines the 
methodology and data sources used for the analysis and finally, the paper presents an analysis 
and discussion of costs and benefits of project components and the findings that have 
implications on identified stakeholder groups.  This analysis can help us to evaluate the current 
project, but more importantly, the research has implications for developing and achieving future 
water policy goals. 
2. Background Information 
Arkansas groundwater protection and management policy has long advocated the wise 
use of groundwater, and conservation, recognizing the holistic view of the water resources 
system (AWP, 2014).  First authorized by Congress in the 1950s, the Grand Prairie Region and 
Bayou Meto Basin flood control projects were re-authorized in 1996 with a broadened scope to 
include ground water protection and conservation, agricultural water supply, and waterfowl 
management (USACE, 2007).  The problem of groundwater depletion can be limited by 
providing a supplemental source of irrigation water, thereby maintaining the aquifer at a level 
which would allow for a sustained yield.  The Corps, the Arkansas Natural Resources 
Commission (ANRC) and the Bayou Meto Water Management District (BMWMD) developed a 
plan to protect and conserve the groundwater resources of the Bayou Meto Basin.  Major features 





Being the state agency with responsibility for protection and management of Arkansas’ 
water resources, ANRC has the financial responsibility for the non-Federal share of construction 
costs.  BMWMD is a legal entity with taxing authority in partnership with the State of Arkansas.  
It was created as quasi-public corporation deriving its powers “directly from the Legislature and 
exercising them as the agent of the property owners in the district whose interests are affected by 
the duties they perform” (ANRC, 2011).  Federal funding for the project was allocated through 
the Corps.  It took several years to get the project started because public funding had to be 
secured -- 65 percent federal and 35 percent state and local -- and the support of farmers who 
will have to pay for the water had to be won over.  Lawsuits by environmental groups also 
delayed construction (Moritz, 2015).  This project was first funded for construction in 2010, and 
it was still not complete as of mid-August 2016. 
The ANRC has authority for establishing critical groundwater levels, aquifer safe/ 
sustainable yields, and water use allocations.  Bayou Meto Basin was designated in 1998 as a 
critical ground water area with one or more of the following conditions: (1) saturated thickness is 
less than 50% of the aquifer thickness: (2) the water level shows declines of at least one foot per 
year within a five-year period, and (3) trends indicate degradation of water quality (ANRC, 
2015).  Also, the ANRC established an annual groundwater pumpage from the alluvial aquifer of 
148,565 acre-feet as the safe yield.  Yield and availability results were based on Arkansas Water 
Law11 regulations and constraints, which have been implemented to protect and conserve 
groundwater resources (ANRC, 2011). 
                                                          




3. Methodology and Data Sources 
The research objectives include benefit-cost analysis of the Bayou Meto Basin project to 
re-examine and expand upon an economic assessment of the on-farm analysis conducted by the 
USACE (2007).  Benefit-cost analysis is an effective tool for policy analysis, as it provides 
decision makers with a clear indication of the most efficient alternative that generates the largest 
net benefits to society, if all alternatives analyzed.  This is useful information for decision 
makers and the public to receive, even when economic efficiency is not the only, or the 
overriding, public policy objective.  However, benefit-cost analysis ignores the distributional 
effects and stakeholder impacts of a public policy.  According to Krutilla (2005), “in providing a 
more complete representation of stakeholder impacts than aggregate efficiency analysis, the 
Kaldor–Hicks tableau offers insights about the political ramifications of a project or policy, as 
well as a better understanding of its economic effects” (p. 864).  We believe that the Kaldor–
Hicks tableau format is well suited to the integrated assessment of both the economic efficiency 
and distributional consequences of the Bayou Meto Basin project. 
The study builds upon secondary data from various federal and state agency reports, 
publications and publicly available information.  The main data source is USACE (2007) 
background data and projections, particularly: cropping pattern projections with and without the 
project; irrigated and dryland crop yield projections; crop price and yield projections; projected 
irrigation water sources with and without the project; projected crop enterprise production costs; 
projected irrigation energy costs with and without the project; project construction and 
operations and maintenance costs; and the estimated benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the project. 
Other data sources for this study include the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the U.S. 




The acre-feet of water in the Alluvial Aquifer are determined from the saturated thickness 
reported annually by the Arkansas Ground-Water Protection and Management Reports.  The cost 
of production information is reported by the University of Arkansas Extension Service.  Crop 
price information is based on the USDA’s normalized prices and the Food and Agriculture 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) future forecasts.  Estimates of annual expenditures for duck 
hunters and wildlife watchers are available from national surveys by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS) to calculate the direct benefits of duck hunting and wildlife watching.  This 
study is also based on the direct and total economic benefits of improving the wildlife habitat 
estimated by Wailes and Young (2005).  The study addresses the economics of project 
construction, duck hunting and wildlife watching as these activities are identified as being 
important positive externalities.  Because the Bayou Meto Basin project contains the Aquifer 
Protection and Agricultural Water Supply, Flood Protection, and Waterfowl Management 
components, this paper decomposes the project into these three parts and addresses each of these 
components separately in the following sections. 
4. Aquifer Protection and Agricultural Water Supply 
The Bayou Meto Basin in Arkansas is facing a major problem due to the lack of a 
dependable water supply to continue irrigation of cropland.  Groundwater withdrawals in excess 
of recharge have resulted in several large cones of depression in the aquifer.  The largest cone is 
centered in Arkansas, Prairie, Lonoke, and Jefferson counties, and is causing changes in 
elevation and flow of streams; damage to bridges, roads, private and public buildings; and 




drying effect on the wetlands as recharge from the aquifer to natural streams decreases as the 
aquifer declines, thereby changing the ecology of the riverine system (Heitmeyer et al., 2004). 
This section examines the economics of Bayou Meto Basin project’s component that is 
designed to protect aquifers and provide a sustainable water supply for irrigation of 300,000 
acres of cropland and for fish farming in the Bayou Meto Improvement Project Area (IPA).  The 
IPA includes 433,166 acres, of which 267,982 are irrigated cropland and 22,079 are commercial 
fishponds.  About 25% of the basin area is forested lands, 10% of which are contained in the 
Bayou Meto WMA.  Timber production in the basin is less than 0.1% of state production 
(USACE, 2007).  The identified irrigation water supply modules are (1) groundwater, (2) 
additional on-farm storage reservoirs, (3) conservation, and (4) an import water system. 
In studies of policy issues related to water management, fundamental principles of 
resource economics must be combined with concepts from a variety of fields (e.g. hydrology, 
engineering, ecology).  In resource economics, groundwater is commonly treated as a non-
renewable resource, the management of which involves determining how to mine the stock in 
every period (Brown and Deacon, 1972; Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp 1983).  
However, recharge is a significant factor in the case of unconfined aquifers, like the Mississippi 
River Valley alluvial aquifer.  Over time, a subsurface layer of water bearing, porous aquifer 
material is recharged naturally from precipitation that infiltrates below ground.  It can also be 
recharged via irrigation flow, due either to canal leakage or excess applied water not consumed 
by crops.  In some cases, water can also naturally discharge from the aquifer to adjacent water 
bodies.  Therefore recharge/discharge, and hence the net growth function, are stock-dependent, 
and unconfined aquifer can be characterized as a renewable resource (Tsur and Zemel, 1995; 




Figure 1 is a schematic depiction of the welfare effects of regulation of intertemporal use 
of groundwater resources as they are meant to be understood conceptually in this section.  
Resource conservation is defined in economics as the efficient intertemporal use of natural 
resources.  User costs can be considered in determining intertemporal marginal social cost at 
time t0 with social discount rate by using a present value discount represented by a line of slope 
(1 + g)/(1 + r) in the upper left quadrant (Just, 2004).  The marginal social benefit curve MSB1 is 
derived by deflating MSB1
* by social discount rate r but then inflating by the recharge rate of g.  
The marginal extraction cost MXC1 is derived similarly and then the marginal social cost at time 
t0 is obtained as MSC0 = MXC0 + MSB1 - MXC1.  Social optimality in Figure 1 can be obtained 
where MSB0 = MSC0 or at quantity q0
*.  Without some form of regulation or recycling, the 
market equilibrium in t0 exceeds the social optimal quantity of q0
*.  This quantity of groundwater 
utilization at time t0 can be obtained by establishing a sustainable quantity of 148,565 acre-ft/yr, 
which is the aquifer safe yield.  The amount of groundwater that can sustainably support crop 
irrigation is about 22% of the Bayou Meto IPA (USACE, 2007).  Therefore, g is considered to be 
22%, and we consider r equal to 5.125%, which is the discount rate used by the Corps to 
calculate NPV for Bayou Meto project.  In Figure 4, the line of slope (1 + g)/(1 + r) is equal to 
1.16.  The welfare effects are a loss of the area a + c at time t0 and a gain of area b + c + d at 
time t1 assuming any tax revenues at time t0 are redistributed in lump-sum payments to time t0.  





Figure 1.  Welfare Effects of Regulation of Intertemporal Use of Groundwater in the Bayou 
Meto Basin 
 
Source: Just et al. (2004)  









































Using recycled water in the agriculture sector can lower groundwater extraction costs and 
conserve water resources.  On-farm reservoirs to mitigate unsustainable groundwater use and 
surface water pollution can receive water from rainfall, diverted surface water, and reused 
irrigation water from agricultural fields targeted for discharge into receiving streams (Kovacs et 
al. 2014).  These systems are, in essence, a method of “recycling water.”  Water recycling can 
reduce the scarcity of groundwater and increase intertemporal groundwater use beyond 𝑞ത.  This 
is because the use of q today leaves less q tomorrow, and this imposes and marginal user cost on 
the future generation.  Note that in the recycling case present consumption need not deprive 
future generations. 
Figure 2 is a representation of the welfare effects of intertemporal water recycling with 
on-farm storage reservoirs for rainfall runoff capture and tailwater recovery systems.  The Bayou 
Meto project can recycle 80,051 acre-ft/yr water.  Let MRC1 represent the discounted marginal 
cost per unit of water resource recovered.  The marginal net benefits for a unit of water resource 
recovered would be the marginal social benefits less the marginal recovery cost, MNBതതതതതതത1 = MSB1 - 
MRC1, whereas the marginal net benefits in Figure 2(c) correspond to marginal social benefits 
less the marginal costs.  Thus, MNBതതതതതതത1 = MNB1 + MXC1 - MRC1 = MNB1 – MNRC1, where 
MNRC1 = MRC1 - MXC1.  The marginal net resource cost of recycling, MNRC1, is the marginal 
recycling cost less the marginal extraction cost that would have been incurred in the absence of 
recycling.  The point of social optimality is at 𝑞ത*, where marginal net benefit is equal to marginal 
net resource cost, MNB0+1 = MNRC1, which corresponds to recycling enough of the resource to 
support additional sustainable consumption of 𝑞ത* - 𝑞ത at over both time periods.  Translating back 
into time periods in Figure 2(a) and (b), this implies optimal discounted marginal net benefits of 






Figure 2.  Welfare Effects of Intertemporal Water Recycling with On-Farm Reservoirs and Tailwater Recovery Systems in the 
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These diagrams in Figure 2 suppose the groundwater is used up in two periods, which is a 
simplification.  However, this analysis can be generalized to the case where recycling takes in 
many time periods by replacing MRC1 with the horizontal summation over time of all relevant 
discounted marginal recycling cost curves.  The access to the recycled water lows the marginal 
user cost of the irrigation water use.  Price ?̅?0* and quantity 𝑞ത0* would not occur unless 
appropriate regulations were imposed as with the with-project case. 
Without recycling, net discounted consumer and producer welfare is the entire area under 
the MNB curves, represented by area a at time t0, by area c at time t1 and by area e for both time 
periods considered jointly.  With recycling, the net present value of benefits over both time 
periods increases by area f + g.  The gain at time t0 is represented by area b in Figure 2(a), 
assuming that recycling costs are incurred only at time t1.  The net gain at time t1 is area d + g – 
h, since area f + h is equal to area b + d; hence, and area f is equal to area b + d - h.  Substituting 
for area f in the overall gain of area f + g and subtracting the gain at time t0, area b, thus obtains 
the gains at time t1 of area d + g - h.  Area g represents a cost savings associated with recycling 
where marginal recycling costs are less than marginal extraction costs.  Area h represents the 
higher cost that must be incurred for consumption at time t1 when marginal recycling costs 
exceed marginal extraction costs.  Since the marginal net benefit curve MNB1 in Figure 2(b) 
relates only to groundwater extraction, both these adjustments to area d are required in 
calculating welfare effects of recycling at time t1.  This solution is valid only if the intersection of 
MNB0+1 and MNRC1 is above the horizontal axis.  Otherwise, recycling would be undertaken to 
the pint of supporting consumption q - 𝑞ത at time t1.  The Bayou Meto project plans to conserve 
96,946 acre-ft/yr water by implementing conservation measures, including improvements in the 




irrigation application methods and soil moisture monitoring that result in increased irrigation 
efficiencies.  These also can be diagrammed similar to the recycling case as in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 depicts long-run demand and supply curves for agricultural irrigation water.  
The demand curve shows at each level of quantity demanded, how much buyers are willing to 
pay for an extra unit of the input.  This is a derived demand that relates the farmers’ willingness 
to pay to the amount of irrigation water to produce crops.   
Figure 3.  Market Demand and Supply Curves for Irrigation Water 
 
In Figure 3, the demand curve (D=MB) is downward-sloping from left to right, reflecting 
the diminishing marginal valuation of successive increments of water.  The supply curve 
(S=MC) slopes upwards, reflecting the fact that increments of demand can normally be met only 
at rising cost to the irrigation system.  The cost schedule is interpreted in the sense of long-run 
marginal costs of expanding the system to meet a permanent increment of demand.  These basic 










where the benefit of reduced consumption is the avoided cost of alternative future supplies.  In 
the market, decisions are based on the private costs and private benefits to market participants.  If 
the consumption or production of goods and services poses an external cost or benefit on those 
not participating in the market, however, then the market demand and supply curves no longer 
reflect the true marginal social benefit and marginal social cost.  Hence, the market equilibrium 
will no longer be the socially (Pareto) efficient outcome.   
Figure 4 demonstrates the supply curve Sg for groundwater as perfectly inelastic at q2, 
reflecting the assumption that the farmers are allowed to pump up to a particular quantity of 
groundwater.  The supply curve Ss for surface water is drawn as perfectly inelastic at q
*, 
reflecting the assumption that a given infrastructure can only supply up to a specific quantity of 
project water.   

































Figure 4 Label and Project Parameters: 
• q1 = q* + q2  
• q2 = qg + qr  
• q* = qi + qc  
• q1 = 649,175 acre-ft/yr (total water demand) 
• qg = 148,565 acre-ft/yr (aquifer safe/sustainable yield) 
• qr = 80,051 acre-ft/yr (storage and tailwater recovery) 
• qi = 323,613 acre-ft/yr (project import) 
• qc = 96,946 acre-ft/yr (project conservation) 
• Sa=Sg + Ss  
• Sg= MSCg with control and limit  
• Ss= supply of project surface water 
In Figure 4, the supply curves MECg-no-control and MECg-control depict the marginal 
external costs of groundwater supplies in “no control” and “with control” cases, respectively.  
Groundwater over drafting involves negative externalities such as land subsidence, drying effects 
on wetlands and streams, decrease in waterfowl due to limited food and habitat availability, etc.  
Marginal external costs include these negative externalities, i.e. negative effect of groundwater 
pumping on the third parties, including neighboring farmers.  Those marginal external costs are 
assumed to be higher in the case of “no control” compared to the “with control” case. 
In Figure 4, the baseline is the “no control” case, where demand for irrigation water 
(D=MB) equals the marginal private cost (MPCg-no-control) of groundwater supply at p
*q*.  In 
the “control” case, the farmers will have to build on-farm storage reservoirs and tail-water 




costs (MPCg-control) of groundwater supply with “control” case is assumed to be higher 
compared to the “no control” one. 
In the absence of proper control and limits, many farmers, in their desperation for water, 
take a chance and invest in drilling deep wells, because their marginal private costs (MPCg no 
control) is low.  However, the supply curve for groundwater Sg (quasi-supply) is equal to the 
marginal social cost curve (MSCg-control), which is obtained by adding marginal external costs 
(MECg-control) and marginal private costs (MPCg-control).  The Arkansas Ground Water 
Protection and Management Act authorizes the ANRC to impose a limit on groundwater use 
through the issuance of groundwater rights within critical groundwater areas (ANRC, 2011).  
Because of lower transaction costs, development of alternative sources might be the preferred 
way of groundwater protection than regulation.  When the Bayou Meto project begins to provide 
supplemental surface water to the project area, the State is expected to begin regulating the 
groundwater use.  As a minimum, new well drilling will not be allowed (ANRC, 2011). 
In Figure 4, the price level p* and quantity amount q* reflect the situation before the 
project is introduced.  In that case, p* represents the marginal private cost of groundwater 
pumping without control (MPCg no control).  Therefore, it would be acceptable for farmers if 
the import irrigation water would cost up to p*.  With this project in place, the State will be able 
to enforce the groundwater pumping limit to the amount of q2, which is the Alluvial Aquifer’s 
safe yield.  Also, usage of the Sparta Aquifer is expected to decline because the surface water 
will be much cheaper than groundwater. 
Managing groundwater and surface water conjunctively can be welfare enhancing.  
Widening the resource problem to a resource system instead of managing each resource 




amount in the area, sizes of the storage and tailwater systems, as well as the capacity irrigation 
canals and pumps are limited, supply of surface water in the region is limited up to quantity Ss, 
and the supply of the groundwater is limited to some Sg quantity set by the State, the aggregate 
supply curve Sa for water can be constructed by horizontally adding Ss to the Sg. 
In Figure 4, introducing the Bayou Meto Basin irrigation project would cause the supply 
curve to shift to the right.  The intersection of the aggregate supply curve (Sa) and demand curve 
(MB) determines the quantities and the marginal benefit of water consumption.  Although it is 
assumed that there is a market determined price before and after the project, this could just be an 
illustration of water supply cost.  In such a case, p* would reflect the operation costs of extracting 
groundwater (per acre feet) before the project, and p1 would be the sum of average ground and 
surface water costs after the project.  If so, the project will result in a decrease in price from p2 to 
p1 and an increase in quantity from q2 to q1, meeting the total irrigation water demand in the 
region.  Area abq*0 measures the value of irrigation water when the quantity q* of water is used 
to irrigate crops in the region, and area acq10 measures the value when the quantity q1 is used.  
This means that the value of the extra crops produced because of using the extra quantity of 
water q*q1 is measured by area bcq
*q1, and, optimal social production is larger than optimal 
private production. 
Krutilla (2005) suggests that secondary market effects can be ignored in project appraisal 
if the secondary markets are perfectly competitive and/or undistorted.  This is even true when the 
project in question is large enough to change the equilibrium conditions in secondary markets.  
Besides being the largest producer of rice in the United States, eastern Arkansas region is a 
major producer of other irrigated crops, such as soybeans, corn and cotton.  Assuming that the 




willing to pay the value of the marginal product of water for an extra unit of water; i.e., they are 
willing to pay for an extra unit of water because of the value of the extra output that will result 
from using that extra unit of input. 
4.1. Stakeholder Analysis for Aquifer Protection and Agricultural Water Supply 
There are five major stakeholder groups that might be affected by the Aquifer Protection 
and Agricultural Water Supply component of the Bayou Meto project: the public (consumers of 
food and the environment), private landowners/farmers/local businesses, the water authority 
(BMWMD), other state agencies, and the Federal government.  Since the prices of crops are 
assumed not to change because of the project, food consumers receive no net benefit: they pay 
exactly what the extra food is worth to them.  However, the public benefits because of lower 
environmental damage from reduced aquifer pumping.  In Figure 4, the water authority revenues 
with the project is area p*bq*0.  The supply of cropland in the region is fixed at the quantity of 
300,000 acres.  As a result of increased water availability, potential farmers are willing to pay 
more rent per acre because of the lower cost of irrigation water.  Because of increased demand 
for land, the market rental value of the land rises and the annual return to landowners rises.  
Since area abp* measures landowner income before the increase in availability of water, and area 
acp1 landowner income after the increase in the supply of water, the area p
*bcp1 represents the 
increase in income to landowners. 
Since the Bayou-Meto Basin project is being funded by Federal and State governments, it 
can be classified as an input subsidy.  Irrigation subsidies can lead to the underpricing of 
irrigated water, which in turn fosters the inefficient use of water (source).  When water is 




In Figure 4, the supply of water is shown as increasing from q* to q1, because of the project, and 
water is sold at price p1, yielding additional revenue of dcq
*q1 to the water authority.  Since area 
bcq1q
* represents the value of additional water sold, there must be an equivalent increase in 
income.  The water authority’s income rises by dcq*q1 so the income of the other factors of 
production, land, for example, must rise by bcd.  Generally, low water fees increase land rent: 
the cheaper that the water can be obtained, the more the land is worth. 
While many subsidies have unintended negative consequences on the environment (Just 
et al., 2004), well designed subsidies can be beneficial when they work to mitigate an 
environmental problem.  Subsidies can raise total surplus when positive externalities are present.  
Just et al. (2004) defines positive externalities as “benefits generated outside of any market 
transaction, and they make someone better off without that person being required to reimburse 
the party responsible for the positive effect” (p. 527).  The Bayou Meto project would provide a 
supply of irrigation water that will allow the aquifer to rebound above the minimum saturated 
thickness, which will, in turn, increase in stream base flows to benefit fish, wildlife and other 
natural resources.  Also, rice fields will continue to provide a major source of grain for the 
waterfowl that utilize the area.  Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that subsidies are always 
bad policy, especially for those stakeholders (the public) who would derive external benefit by 
gains to the area e, as shown in Figure 4. 
5. Flood Control Component 
In the Bayou Meto area, the majority of floods occur primarily in the first and second 
quarters of the year, the frequency of flooding occurrences is about two times annually, and 




frequent flooding in the Bayou Meto Basin are include: (a) flood damage to roads and bridges, 
crops and non-crop items such as ditches, land leveling, irrigation systems, fences, farm supplies, 
grain bins, etc.; (b) a restriction on the ability of farm operators to apply production inputs and 
techniques; and, (c) flood damage resulting from quick concentration of rainfall runoff combined 
with the inadequacy of the existing channel systems to remove flood water from the low-lying 
areas and manage flows from the upstream areas.  For instance, continuous development in and 
around Jacksonville, AR cause flooding problems in the northern area along Bayou Meto River 
(USACE, 2006).  
In response to these problems, the U.S. Congress acknowledged flood control as essential 
for the protection of the Bayou Meto area’s human and natural resources.  The initial project, 
authorized by section 204 of the Flood Control Act of 1950, was for flood control in the area 
(USACE, 2007).  However, this flood control project was re- authorized in 1986 with a 
broadened scope of responsibility.  The resulting federal, state and local partnership approach led 
the Corps, ANRC and BMWMD to plan a Flood Control component in the Bayou Meto Basin 
project.  Project activities include channel cleanout and enlargement in the Bayou Meto Basin, 
construction of a pumping plant, and water control structures on affected streams.  Improvements 
to existing channels would reduce flooding and eliminate induced impacts from the agricultural 
water supply component.  Measures to enhance water management for fish and wildlife, protect 
and restore bottomland hardwoods, provide for positive drainage, and restore natural flow 
regimes are integral parts of the planned improvements.  These would be positive externalities 
generated by the flood control component.  Also, it should be noted that the flood control is a 
public good: once a local flood control project is built, anyone in the protected area enjoys flood 




be excluded from enjoying a public good, there is a legitimate role for government to provide 
public goods and to create conditions for cost recovery. 
Figure 5 is a market for flood protection, where S1 is supply curve without-project, S2 is 
supply curve with-project, q1 is quantity of flood control without-project, q2 is quantity with-
project, area abp1 is without-project social welfare, and area acp2 is with-project social welfare.  
The quality of living depends on the price of living in the flood plain, which includes flood 
damages incurred while living on this land.  Flood protection reduces annual flood damage 
which lowers the average price of living in the flood plain from p1 to p2.  A price change 
increases consumer surplus - the value received in addition to the price paid.  Change in social 
welfare with the project is given by the area p1bcp2.  

























Since the project area is relatively small compared to the overall U.S. agricultural areas, 
we assume that any alternative level of flood protection would not significantly affect total 
national agricultural production.  Society would be willing to pay an amount of money equal to 
the increased consumer surplus they realize from flood protection in order to obtain the flood 
control.  In Figure 5 it is shown as the change in consumer surplus due to existing q1 and the 
change in consumer surplus due to increased q2.  Flood damage reduction benefits, measured as 
the area p1bcp2, are mostly attributable to agriculture and rural development.  Besides agriculture 
and rural development, area bcd represents also the incidental benefits to the environment, such 
as reduced timber stress in the bottomland hardwood community, decreased damage from early 
fall flooding as well as damage from spring inundation of bottomland hardwoods, increased 
wetland and terrestrial resources through the reforestation of frequently flooded marginal 
farmland, and decreased aquatic resource exposure to chemical contaminants, etc. which can be 
explained as a positive externality.  Without the project, the Bayou Meto WMA would continue 
to be flooded to cause greater deterioration of the waterfowl and wildlife habitat, primarily as a 
result of reduction in bottomland hardwoods that provide food for the waterfowl and wildlife in 
the basin (Heitmeyer et al., 2004). 
There are clear crop sector benefits to be gained as well as environmental benefits.  
However, data were limited to assess the value of reduced damage to the environment.  In the 
absence of market prices and demand curve, it seems reasonable to assume that land owners 
would be willing to pay up to the amount of damage they would avoid by this project.  We are 
interested in changes that take place as a result of the project.  Total average annual benefits for 
the flood control component were determined by the Corps to be $5.56 million (USACE 2007, p. 




by the Corps at $16.5 million.  Then the Corps used their Computerized Agricultural Crop Flood 
Damage Assessment System (CACFDAS) to calculate the crop and non-crop flood damages, as 
well as the baitfish farming operation flood damages with-project condition.  As benefits were 
derived by obtaining the difference in projected damage values for without- and with-project 
condition, and annualizing the projected benefit values, we think that it provide a reasonable 
estimate of the area p1bcp2 in Figure 5.  
5.1. Stakeholder Analysis for Flood Control Component 
There are five major stakeholder groups that might be affected by the Flood Control 
component of the Bayou Meto Basin project: the public (consumers of crop and fish), private 
landowners/crop and fish farmers, the water authority (BMWMD), other state agencies, and the 
Federal government.  The project would provide inundation reduction benefits consisting of 
damage reduction to development expected to exist for present conditions and the reduction of 
damage to additional development without project installation.  According to the NED/NER 
recommended plan, the reduction in annual flood damages for baitfish operations would be 
69.1%, crops 23%, non-crop agriculture 20%, and public roads and bridges 1% (USACE, 2006, 
table F-40).  The Corps have determined benefits from flood damage reduction to public roads 
and bridges by subtracting projected with-project damages ($126,000) from projected without-
project damages ($124,000) and annualizing the difference.  Average inundation reduction 
benefits ($4.1 million) to agricultural crops are based on an analysis of practices on lands not 
incurring changes in cropping patterns due to the project.  Benefits from flood damage reduction 
to agricultural non-crop items, such as farm roads, fences, irrigation systems, drainage ditches, 




values projected with project damage values.  With the Bayou Meto project, baitfish/catfish farm 
operations will be benefited to the extent that flood damages to these activities can be 
significantly reduced, which is estimated as a difference in projected damage values for without-
project and with-project conditions.  Since the cost of floodplain farming is assumed to decrease 
because of the project, the farmers and landowners receive benefits by an amount measured by 
area p1bcp2.  In Figure 5, area acq20 measures the total value of flood control in the region once 
the additional quantity of flood protection is available.  Note also that area bcq2q1 measures the 
reduced damage once the project is completed.  
6. Waterfowl Management Component 
The Bayou Meto Basin area is one of the most significant waterfowl resources along the 
North American Flyway.  The Bayou Meto WMA occupies 33,700 acres of bottomland 
hardwood wetland and is a very important wintering habitat for mallards (Heitmeyer et al., 
2004).  The Bayou Meto WMA has been owned and operated by the AGFC since the 1950s.  
The AGFC policy for many years was to impound as much surface water as possible for 
waterfowl hunting in fall and winter (Heitmeyer et al., 2004).  There has been a severe loss of 
habitat and food supply for wildlife because of the prolonged flooding.  This component of the 
project offers significant opportunities to restore and enhance 55,000 acres of fish and wildlife 
habitat, including the Bayou Meto WMA. 
Wildlife watching and hunting are important recreational activities in the Bayou Meto 
Basin and are also a significant source of income to the state.  According to Heitmeyer (2004), 
the Bayou Meto WMA helps to support the duck population in the whole Bayou Meto Basin and 




Table 1.  Sales of AGFC hunting licenses and duck stamps in Arkansas 
Fiscal Year (end 
6/30)  





1984 313,545 46,451 50 14.8% 
1985 310,491 46,465 50 15.0% 
1986 302,661 52,432 40 17.3% 
1987 332,934 51,820 40 15.6% 
1988 293,465 47,673 40 16.2% 
1989 316,596 37,586 30 11.9% 
1990 305,674 37,530 30 12.3% 
1991 293,467 40,507 30 13.8% 
1992 311,088 39,356 30 12.7% 
1993 313,982 41,315 30 13.2% 
1994 314,668 46,702 30 14.8% 
1995 319,070 54,953 40 17.2% 
1996 322,780 62,438 50 19.3% 
1997 319,011 70,703 50 22.2% 
1998 330,665 76,037 60 23.0% 
1999 343,483 80,849 60 23.5% 
2000 326,838 85,086 60 26.0% 
2001 332,651 92,892 60 27.9% 
2002 336,235 95,863 60 28.5% 
2003 319,056 89,454 60 28.0% 
2004 306,545 85,104 60 27.8% 
2005 305,978 83,412 60 27.3% 
2006 304,823 71,696 60 23.5% 
2007 330,113 78,140 60 23.7% 
2008 339,901 77,659 60 22.8% 
2009 381,958 80,206 60 21.0% 
2010 372,124 76,501 60 20.6% 
2011 375,698 79,096 60 21.1% 
2012 382,436 86,319 60 22.6% 
2013 396,192 92,025 60 22.8% 
2014 404,453 98,115 60 24.3% 
2015 411,162 104,145 60 25.3% 
2016 405,085 99,973 60 24.7% 
Source: Arkansas Game and Fish Commission data 
Waterfowl seasons in recent years continue to exhibit unpredictable and sometimes 
inexplicable patterns of duck abundance, or lack thereof.  According to the Midwinter Waterfowl 




Arkansas, whereas in 2017 these corresponding numbers were 250,439 and 219,106 (AGFC, 
2017).  Although waterfowl numbers have declined in Arkansas, as well as in the Bayou Meto 
Basin, the importance of waterfowl watching and hunting in the state has been increasing until 
recently (Table 1).  
In the United States, each individual older than 16 years of age must purchase a Federal 
Migratory Bird Hunting Conservation Stamp (hereafter, duck stamp) before hunting waterfowl, 
which costed $25 in 2015-16 FY.  Ninety-eight percent of the funding derived from duck stamp 
sales goes directly to the purchase or lease of waterfowl habitat within the National Wildlife 
Refuge system, including Wetland Management Districts and Waterfowl Production Areas 
(USFWS, 2015).  In 2015-16 FY, Arkansas non-residential waterfowl stamps sold for $35 each, 
whereas the residential one sold for $7 only.  Both the residential and non-residential duck stamp 
sales and their total revenues have increased during the past decade in Arkansas (Table 2). 












2006 71,696 43,527 28,169 39% 868,069 
2007 78,140 47,676 30,564 39% 944,312 
2008 77,659 46,901 30,758 40% 943,467 
2009 80,206 48,918 31,288 39% 968,186 
2010 76,501 47,039 29,462 39% 918,513 
2011 79,096 47,440 31,656 40% 965,200 
2012 86,319 50,417 35,902 42% 1,070,959 
2013 92,025 52,947 39,078 42% 1,706,349 
2014 98,115 56,884 41,231 42% 1,841,273 
2015 104,145 58,324 45,821 44% 2,012,003 
2016 99,973 54,454 45,519 46% 1,974,343 
Source: Arkansas Game and Fish Commission data 
Wildlife recreation is economically important in the Bayou Meto Basin.  Over 40 private 




duck hunting, during the hunting season.  According to USFWS (2013), hunting by U.S. 
residents is a big business with estimated hunter expenditures of almost $1,018.8 million in 2011 
in Arkansas.  Duck hunting is especially important in the Bayou Meto Basin, with numerous 
private hunting clubs and other infrastructure, such as outfitters and guides, which are dependent 
on duck hunting clientele.  The 2011 Survey also estimated that 852,000 U.S. residents 
participate in wildlife-watching in Arkansas, of those 137,000 are away from home participants, 
and 820,000 are around-the-home participants.  All participants spent $216 million on wildlife 
watching in 2011 in Arkansas, which includes $34.52 million for trip related expenses and 
$181.55 million for equipment and other expenses (USFWS, 2013). 
An economic assessment of the environmental recreation benefits is presented in the 
section below.  First, estimates are provided of the value of duck hunting without and with the 
project.  Second, estimates are provided of the economic value of improving the ecosystem to 
enhance wildlife watching.  Finally, the aggregate net effect, with and without the project, is 
estimated.  The assumptions used to make projections of the demand for duck hunting were 
based on recent trends in duck stamp sales in the five counties (Arkansas, Jefferson, Lonoke, 
Prairie, and Pulaski) in the Bayou Meto Basin, which were provided by the AGFC.  Multiplier 
effects on total economic activity, employment, wages and salaries, state sales and income taxes 
and federal income taxes were based on estimates provided in Caudill (2014) and Southwick 
Associates (2003). 
6.1. Economics of Enhancing the Bayou Meto Basin for Duck Hunting 
The economic value of the Bayou Meto project for duck hunting is based on an analysis 




for the Bayou Meto Basin (Heitmeyer, 2005).  In an earlier study, Heitmeyer et al. (2004) 
estimated that the degradation of the Bayou Meto WMA has resulted in a significant decrease in 
water bird numbers.  For example, based on AGFC unpublished records, they note that “mid-
winter inventories of ducks in the Basin have gradually decreased from over 100,000 during the 
1960s and 1970s to less than 50,000 in the 1990s” (p. 28).   
Figure 6 shows that duck-stamp sales in the five counties in the Bayou Meto Basin 
increased since the 1990s (Wailes and Young, 2005).  However, in the previous years, duck 
stamp sales declined, as one might expect, as a result of the decline in the waterfowl habitat and 
duck inventories in the area.   
 
Source: Wailes and Young, 2005 
Without having reliable data to estimate the relationships between the demand for duck 
stamps and demand variables, a trend analysis of duck stamp sales data was conducted by Wailes 
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are found to be significantly different from zero, with t-statistics given in parentheses, and a fit of 
the equation to the actual data that explains 95 percent of the year-to-year variation.  
𝑙𝑛 (Duck Stamp Sales) = 10.058 + 0.273 * 𝑙𝑛 (Time) 
(283.704) (12.126) 
R2 = 0.954 
Where Time = 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, …. 
Wailes and Young (2005) used this equation to project the future demand for duck 
stamps with the project, based on the assumption of successful restoration of the water bird 
habitat and maintenance of rice production in the basin area.  Estimates of future demand for 
duck stamp sales without the project, with further degradation of the wildlife management area 
and significant decline in rice production in the area. 
𝑙𝑛 (Duck Stamp Sales) = 10.058 - 0.2 * (𝑙𝑛 (Time) – 2) 
On the base of this synthetically derived equation, the projections of duck stamp sales in 





Source: Wailes and Young, 2005 
The estimates of duck stamp sales were used to generate direct sales expenditures by 
duck hunters in the Bayou Meto Basin.  Arkansas waterfowl stamp sales during the 2014-15 
season rose for the fifth consecutive year to a new record high of 104,629 (up from 98,115 in 
2013-14).  Resident duck stamp sales rose to 58,827 (56,884 in 2013-14) while non-resident 
duck stamp sales rose to 45,802 (41,231 in 2013-14).  Continued high waterfowl populations 
caused by improved habitat conditions likely encouraged increased duck stamp purchases 
especially among the non-residents (AGFC 2016).  
Figure 8 is a market for duck hunting, where S1 is supply curve without-project, S2 is 
supply curve with-project, q1 is quantity without-project, q2 is quantity with-project, area pa0 is 
without-project social welfare, and area pb0 is with-project social welfare.  Although the Bayou 

























































































































Figure 7.  With- and Without Project Impact on Change in Duck Stamp 
Sales in Bayou Meto Basin




curve in duck hunting market would be perfectly elastic.  When the demand curve is perfectly 
elastic, there will be no consumer surplus. 
Figure 8.  Impact of Waterfowl Management Component 
 
In Figure 8 a change in social welfare with the project is given by the area pb0, society 
would be willing to pay an amount of money equal to the increased producer surplus they realize 
from wildlife habitat enhancement.  These surpluses are shown as the change in producer surplus 
due to existing q1 and the change in producer surplus due to increased q2. 
The economic value of the Bayou Meto Basin project for environmental recreation is 
based upon ending the deterioration of waterfowl and wildlife habitat and restoring the area as 
one of the premier duck hunting and wildlife watching areas in the state of Arkansas and the 
nation.  When the direct spending benefits of duck hunting and wildlife watching are added to 
the direct benefits to the crop sector, the calculated BCR for the project increases from 1.25 to 













provide investment in structural improvements that will facilitate implementation of the Bayou 
Meto Wetland Management Plan described in detail by Heitmeyer et al. (2004). 
6.2. Stakeholder Analysis for the Waterfowl Management Component 
There are three major stakeholder groups that might be affected by waterfowl 
management component: consumers (duck hunters and wildlife enthusiasts), AFGC / game land 
owners in the region and the Federal government.  Although the price of duck stamps is assumed 
not to change because of the project, consumers receive a net benefit due to increased wildlife 
availability, and they pay exactly what the extra duck stamp is worth to them.  The AFGC / game 
land owners benefit by an amount measured by area ab0, which is the change in duck stamp 
revenues.  Area pbq20 in Figure 8 measures the total value of duck hunting in the region once the 
additional quantity of wildlife habitat is available.  
7. Distributional Effects of the Bayou Meto Basin Project 
According to Ostrom (1990), theory regarding collective action to regulate common-pool 
problems comes when: a) there is broad consensus or agreement on the aggregate benefits to be 
gained, b) the parties perceive positive net gains from agreement, and c) they are homogeneous 
with respect to bargaining objectives and in the distribution of the costs and benefits to be 
incurred.  The term “distributional effect” refers to the impact of a policy or project across the 
population and economy, divided up in various ways (OMB, 2003).  A Kaldor-Hicks tableau 
(KHT) is a matrix format that comprehensively displays a project’s economic and financial 
effects (Krutilla, 2005).  Utilizing the KHT format, we can measure the distributional effects of 




identified for each component of the project.  The principal reasons for such an examination are 
to improve the accuracy of the efficiency analysis itself, recognizing that impacts on stakeholders 
influence the social production function upon which a project is based, and to better demonstrate 
the structure and distributional effects of the project components.  
Figures 4, 5 and 8 are visual representations of the distorted market equilibrium which 
results from the implementation of the Bayou Meto Basin project components in three markets.  
First, it will protect ground water, and provide a sustained water supply for irrigation of about 
300,000 acres of cropland and fish farming in the Bayou Meto IPA.  Secondly, it will provide 
major flood control benefits in an important agricultural region of the state.  Thirdly, it will 
enhance 55,000 acres of fish and wildlife habitat, including the Bayou Meto WMA. 
Table 3 contains all the labels and values used to construct KHT for the Bayou Meto 
Project.  Label B1 represents the net-value of the irrigation water supply to water users beyond 
water use charges; B2 shows the net value of reduced flood damage to beneficiaries of flood 
control.  B3 represents the net-value of the wildlife and recreational benefits to duck hunters and 
wildlife enthusiasts beyond hunting charges.  B4 shows the net value for the public the lowered 
environmental damage beyond any financial or other costs they incur. 
In Table 3, supply-side costs are aggregated into the following categories: on-farm 
irrigation features, the opportunity cost of which is (–C1); off-farm infrastructure of new 
irrigation systems, the opportunity cost of which is (–C2); the O&M costs of on-farm irrigation, 
including the time opportunity cost of newly-employed farm workers, the total of which is (–
C3); operational costs of new import system is (-C4) and O&M of flood control is (–C6); flood 




waterfowl management, the opportunity cost of which is (–C7); and, O&M costs of additional 
wildlife management services, the opportunity cost of which is (–C8). 
The financial transfers associated with the project include water fees collected from water 
users (-T1) and duck stamp fees collected from hunters (-T2), which partially finance the project.  
The BMWD collects tax from landowners in project area T3, which is a dedicated property tax 
surcharge (assumed to be the project’s impact).  Businesses/workers also incur a larger income 
tax liability (-T4) that results from higher productivity the project stimulates.  The federal 
government only receives the fraction a (a < 0) of the income tax receipts.  The State collects the 
fraction of tax payments the federal government does not receive, i.e., (1 - a) T4.  Numerical 
values for costs, benefits and transfer payments were obtained from USACE (2006), USACE 
(2007), and Wailes and Young (2005).  These values are adjusted to 2016 dollars using 
consumer and producer price indices specific to each component.  
The resultant KHT is illustrated in Table 4.  The baseline against which this project is 
being compared is a “without-project” alternative.  The bottom row, each entry of which is the 
summation of the cell entries in the column above, shows the net effects on the affected 
stakeholders, i.e., the conventional consumer surplus and producer surplus measures, and the tax 
revenue received by the public.  Summing these net effects across columns yields the net-















Benefits      
Value of Irrigated Crops B1 45,909,000 57,082,071 UCASE 2007, p. 327 
difference between the with- 
and without-project conditions 
Flood Damage Reduction B2 5,559,000 6,911,918 UCASE 2007, p. 327  
Recreational Benefits B3 34,880,000 43,368,895 
Wailes & Young 
2005, p. 37  
 
Lower Environmental Damage B4 n/a n/a UCASE 2007, p. 312 
16,076 Average Annualized 
Habitat Unit 
Costs      
On-farm Irrigation Features C1 4,751,000 5,907,271 USACE 2007, p. 137 Interest & sinking fund 
Off-farm Import System C2 21,997,000 27,350,505 USACE 2007, p. 137 Interest & sinking fund 
O&M On-Farm Irrigation C3 920,000 1,143,904 USACE 2007, p. 137  
O&M Off-farm Import System C4 3,315,000 4,121,786 USACE 2007, p. 137 
will be paid for as farmers 
receive benefits for the project 
Flood Control Infrastructure C5 2,510,000 3,120,870 USACE 2007, p. 327 Federal 75%, non-federal 25% 
O&M Flood Control C6 32,000 39,788 USACE 2007, p. 326  
Waterfowl Management 
Infrastructure 
C7 6,814,958 8,473,544 USACE 2007, p. 298 Federal 65%, non-federal 35% 
O&M Waterfowl Management C8 1,466,000 1,822,787 USACE 2007, p. 326  
Transfers      
Water Fees T1 25,510,000 31,718,479 USACE 2007, p. 379 
BMWMD contracts with water 
users for 323,613 acre-feet. 
Duck Stamp Fees T2 1,500,000 1,500,000 Table 2 in this paper  
Property Tax Surcharge T3 600,000 746,025 USACE 2007, p. 379 
tax=($2.00*290,061 irri. acres) 
+($0.50*44,436 floodpl. acres) 
State Sales & Fed Income Tax T4 5,099,550 6,340,649 
Wailes & Young 
2005, pp. 27-29 































- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - million dollars - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Benefits          
Irrigated Crops’ 
Value 
   57.08     57.08 
Flood Damage 
Reduction 
  6.91      6.91 
Recreational 
Benefits* 
43.37        43.37 
Low Environmental 
Damage 
    B4**    B4 
Costs          
On-farm Irrigation     -5.91     -5.91 
Import System      -17.78  -7.70 -27.35 
O&M On-farm 
Irrigation 
   -1.14     -1.14 
O&M Import 
System 
   -4.12     -4.12 
Flood Control 
System 
     -2.34  -0.78 -3.12 
O&M Flood 
Control 




 -2.97    -5.50   -8.47 
O&M Wildlife 
Management 
 -1.82       -1.82 






























- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - million dollars - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Transfers          
Water Fees    -27.35  17.78  9.57 0 
Duck Stamp Fees -1.50 0.90    0.60   0 
Property Tax 
Surcharge 
  -0.03 -0.72   0.75  0 
Business/Income 
Tax 
 -6.34    3.80  2.54 0 
Net 41.87 -10.23 6.85 17.84 B4 -3.44 0.75 1.76 55.38+B4 
*Arkansas Game and Fish Commission and private land owners/farmers may capture some of these benefits in higher land values 





Table 4 represents a partially-specified, hybrid KHT for the Bayou Meto project.  Cell 
entries in this KHT represent annualized values.  Whenever it is available, numerical values are 
assigned to the benefits, costs, and transfers (note that the totals in the net columns may not sum 
at the single decimal place due to rounding error).  Column titles in the KHT indicate stakeholder 
categories disaggregated at a selected level, while row titles represent the project’s benefits, 
costs, and financial transfers.  Within this matrix, the project’s benefits and costs are distributed 
to the stakeholders who bear them, and financial transfers between stakeholders are also 
recorded.  A summation across rows gives the net stakeholder impacts as the boundary row at the 
bottom of the KHT, while a summation across columns yields a final column on the right-hand 
side of the tableau, displaying the conventional benefit-cost valuation.  
The right-hand side of the KHT shows the fundamental input-output valuation: the 
benefits of the project (B1+B2+B3+B4) and its costs (C1+C3+C4+C6+C7+C8).  Also indicated 
are the opportunity costs of public finance (C2+C5).  The bottom row of the KHT shows the net 
effects on the indicated stakeholders.  These will sum to the fundamental economic evaluation 
(B1+B2+B3+B4) - (C1+C2+C3+C4+C5+C6+C7+C8), since the financial transfers exchanged 
among stakeholders cancel out in the summation.  Within the KHT itself are indicated the 
benefit, cost, or transfer components that give rise to the net effects.  
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
The Bayou Meto Basin project is an adopted solution by federal, state and local interests 
to resolve many water and environmental management issues in eastern Arkansas (Sullivan, 
2016).  Generally, a good project should contribute to the country’s economic output; hence it 




particular project or policy, and some stakeholders may lose.  Moreover, groups that benefit from 
a project are not necessarily those that incur the costs of the project.  Nevertheless, society as a 
whole is better off, even if some of its members are worse off.  In welfare economics, the 
compensation principle recognizes the existence of “winners” and “losers”.  It allows that if the 
winners gain enough from the project that they could, hypothetically, reimburse the losers, then 
the project is worth undertaking whether there is a reimbursement or not (Just et al., 2004).  
Identifying those who will gain, those who will pay, and those who will lose can give us ideas 
about the incentives that various stakeholders have to see that the project is implemented as 
designed. 
KHT in Table 4 shows that all stakeholders within the project region at least don’t lose, 
with the project region net benefits total to $55.38 million and with lower environmental 
damage.  Beyond revealing the complete structure of the project and stakeholder effects on all 
parties, this partially-specified KHT displays the degree of revenue shortfall in “Game Land 
Owners” and “Federal Government” that must be made up by some means.  While the hunters 
and wildlife enthusiasts are the largest gainers of any single stakeholder group, the main loser is 
the “Game Land Owners” group.  Although the AGFC and private land owners and farmers may 
capture some of the recreational benefits in higher land values, there needs to be thorough 
planning to implement price increases in an optimal manner to generate revenue while 
minimizing the potential loss in duck stamp sales due to price increases.  According to Martin-
Wilbourn Partners (2012), twenty-five percent of duck stamp purchasers in Arkansas indicated 
that they would not buy a duck stamp if the price was raised to $25.  This suggests that the 




jeopardy, and requires separate discussion about what is necessary to sustain the North American 
Model of Wildlife Conservation as it pertains to waterfowl hunting (Geist et al. 2001). 
As Wildavsky (1966) put it, “because the cost-benefit formula does not always jibe with 
political realities - that is, it omits political costs and benefits - we can expect it to be twisted out 
of shape from time to time” (p. 298).  KHT displays that the “Federal Government,” i.e. 
taxpayers out-of-state, incur the financing charges and their associated opportunity costs, with a 
loss in the amount of $3.44 million.  KHT also shows that with annual net-benefit of $17.84 
million, the “Crop Land Owners/ Farmers” are the second largest gainers among stakeholder 
groups.  The Bayou Meto Basin land is predominately in private ownership, but there has been 
an increasing trend to absentee ownership over the past few years.  With the project completed 
and in place, irrigated crop production can continue to be the dominant economic activity in the 
region, therefore benefits will be concentrated to landowners as discussed in Section 4.1 above. 
Because environmental preservation is considered a common form of public good, there 
is a need for the government intervention to generate non-monetized B4 benefits, measured in 
average annualized habitat unit.  Deductions with more than one missing value in the KHT will 
not necessarily be definitive.  But portraying the partially-specified KHT can offer useful 
insights to decision makers about the nature of the tradeoffs, even if the conclusions are not 
definitive.  One possibility would be to augment the standard efficiency analysis to incorporate 
not-typically monetized public goods related to “warm glow”, as it is referred to in the valuation 
literature (see Portney, 1994; Hanemann, 1994).  Preserving the environment could generate 
“warm glow”, given that the level of damage is an important issue to local voters.  Hopefully, the 




In general, as Haveman (1976) and others have pointed out, politicians prefer projects 
that concentrate benefits on particular interest groups, and camouflage costs or diffuse them 
widely over the population.  The Bayou Meto Project benefits are localized, while the Federal 
share of costs comes from taxpayers across the country.  Thus, though the “Floodplain Land 
Owners” are made better off by $6.85 million, some taxpayers are made worse off because they 
receive no benefits from the project and must pay some of the costs.  The “Water District”, i.e. 
the BMWMD is a quasi-governmental entity, is taking financial responsibility for and working 
with landowners and other state agencies to obtain the funds needed for the non-Federal 
construction costs of the project.  Project funding for 2016 was $16.2 million less than 2015 even 
though the additional funding for ongoing work for 2016 was supposed to be $10 million more 
than in 2015.  Awarding any new contracts for constructing the groundwater protection/water 
supply component of the project is excluded.  The project was $15 million short in Federal funds 
to complete the construction needed to deliver the first water into the Basin and start generating 
some income.  The BMWMD has collected assessed property taxes $350,000 per year to support 
the project for the past twelve years, and the non-Federal expenses on the project are more than 
$140 million (Sullivan, 2016). 
The non-Federal construction costs for the irrigation and flood control components of the 
Bayou Meto Project are being funded with bonds issued through the ANRC and paid for through 
the sale of water and tax assessments on benefited acreage within the Bayou Meto IPA levied by 
the BMWMD.  Water charges paid to “Other State Agency” are a payment by farmers to the 
“Water District” in exchange for the use of water.  Whether a government levy is a payment for 
goods and services or a tax depends on whether the levy is directly associated with the purchase 




the service.  Irrigation charges may not cover the true cost of supplying the service; thus, while 
they indicate a real resource flow as opposed to a transfer payment, the real economic cost would 
be better measured by estimating the long-run marginal cost of supplying the water and showing 
the difference as a subsidy to water users. 
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Chapter V.  Conclusions 
This dissertation chapter summarizes the research findings encompassed by the previous 
three articles on water resources, and discusses the policy implications and limitations of the 
studies.  The theory of common-pool resources provided the conceptual grounding to an 
understanding of the policy context of economic development and the environmental 
sustainability.  The essays in this dissertation are focused on physical, institutional, economic 
and environmental variables that are often overlooked, but which policymakers can and should 
leverage to improve agricultural policymaking.   
Irrigation is a major input to agriculture in regions where the evapotranspiration potential 
exceeds the moisture level available from rainfall.  While physical factors determine the rainfall 
amount received by a region, the flow of water through an irrigation system to a farmer’s field 
depends not only on water availability but also on the system’s physical structures.  It also 
depends on the system’s social structures and the institutions that facilitate the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of the physical structures.  The experience in different parts of the 
world has demonstrated that participatory irrigation management facilitates achievement of 
higher efficiencies of water utilization and equitable water distribution, promotes better and more 
cost-effective operation and maintenance, and helps improve cost recovery.   
The transition of Aral Sea Basin countries to market economies and reengineering of the 
water resources systems to meet the requirements of the new realities provides a unique 
opportunity to promote participation and empowerment of the beneficiaries in design, 
implementation, and management of irrigation systems.  Chapter 2 is designed as a structural 
analysis of agriculture and water sectors, and a case study of a typical Basin Irrigation System 




implementing agricultural reforms, and highlights the main features of a framework that needs to 
be developed.  An analysis of the sectoral policy discourse reveals that there are no clear 
strategies or consistent policy interventions designed to address the efficiency issues facing 
irrigation systems and also a lack of participatory irrigation management.  Notwithstanding this, 
the Water Users’ Associations (WUAs) within the sector were introduced as a partner in 
irrigation system management.  These undertakings have very little impact on certain segments 
of the farming sub-population, because the government subsidizes costs of irrigation in exchange 
for cotton and wheat procured at low prices.  Long-term success in reviving the country’s 
economy can be based upon broad macroeconomic reforms, accompanied by microeconomic 
interventions in the agriculture sector, as well as specific reforms regarding water management 
and irrigation water use, in particular. 
This study proposes a national program in public sector and private sector cost-sharing 
investment for irrigation water supply in Uzbekistan.  In addition to rehabilitation of the physical 
infrastructure, the research identifies motivations for stakeholders to participate in irrigation 
management.  Participatory irrigation management would be one of the ways of increasing 
agricultural productivity and providing needed flows to the Aral Sea and other endangered 
ecological systems in Central Asia through improved efficiency of water use and conveyance 
systems.  Functional WUAs will be able to manage scarce water on an equitable basis.  In the 
long-term it will be possible to raise awareness of the significance of water scarcity to induce 
shifts to more water saving techniques.  This could lead to either further agricultural 
development or to water savings for the environment i.e. the Aral Sea.  Currently there is a 
serious lag in the development of appropriate institutions to deal with the new environment of 




(i) allocate water equitably among competing uses and users,  
(ii) integrate irrigation management at farm, system, and basin levels to reduce 
upstream-downstream and head-tail conflicts,  
(iii) integrate the management of ground and surface water irrigation, and  
(iv) address problems of irrigation development on environmental health. 
In Arkansas, if there is water shortage in any stream to meet requirements of all water 
needs water can be allocated among the competing uses so that each use obtains an equitable 
portion of the amount of water available.  The remaining water can be allocated in the following 
order of preference: (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) hydropower, and (4) recreation.  There are 
mounting pressures on the agricultural sector due to increased competition for water from the 
municipal, industrial and mining sectors in Arkansas, as well increased water shortages in many 
parts of the state.  Chapter 3 details specifics of the legislative framework, and the environmental 
and sectoral obstacles that need to be considered during state water planning processes.  Any 
pattern of water resource use, and attempts to govern that use, are partly a result of a confluence 
of different, and often independent, historical developments.  As Shabman (1984) states “choices 
are made in response to opportunities and constraints understood to be effective at the moment a 
decision is made” (p. 53-54). 
There are other institutional and sectoral deficiencies that constitute underlying causes of 
water insecurity in Arkansas.  The research findings reveal that a majority of the small cities in 
this study had implemented declining block rates, which are regarded as non-conservation 
pricing mechanisms.  Inclining block rates, under which consumers have incentive to conserve 
water, are being implemented in four cities with more than 20,000 populations, while another 




neutral).  This finding was due to a combination of inadequate infrastructure and the lack of 
water conservation requirements in state law.  Chapter 3 shows that there is a need for 
coordination between water utilities to implement a conservation-oriented rate structure for 
different water-use sectors through state agencies such as ANRC and APSC.  Also, the use of 
economic tools such as water trading and water markets for cost-effective redistribution of water 
from areas or uses with surplus to those experiencing water shortage should be encouraged in 
state water policy. 
Effective involvement and participation of the beneficiaries are the instruments for the 
success of any development project.  The beneficiaries are considered to be important 
organizational units in a responsive management system that is essentially required for 
sustainable irrigated agriculture.  Chapter 4 examines the extent to which government 
intervention reflects stakeholder group perspectives and articulates strategies to achieve a 
common-pool resource sustainability in Bayou Meto Basin, Arkansas.   
In order for stakeholders to contribute more meaningfully to water security they must be 
able to access project information, adopt new technologies and maintain relationships with a 
wide variety of actors.  This information is useful because it can allow policymakers to directly 
improve information flow by building on the existing user patterns and social processes.  Wailes 
and Young (2005) believed, and this research confirms, that the project will provide large 
economic and environmental benefits that can help sustain irrigated agriculture and wildlife 
habitat in parts of the five counties that are included in the Bayou Meto Basin.  However, we 
argue that the stakeholder impact and participation is the missing element. 
The state remains a vital player in the agricultural sector in Arkansas but the discursive 




shown that government interventions have failed to adequately mobilize resources to target a 
large segment of the stakeholders’ population.  Policymakers need to be mindful of the fact that 
stakeholders are not a homogeneous group and they all, to some degree, contribute to water 
availability.  The project can ill-afford to alienate participants in the wildlife recreation and 
agriculture sectors, therefore these stewards of the local environment must be accommodated in 
plans for sustainable project outcomes. 
Conspicuously, the decade-long project history discourse sparingly includes text salient 
to other significant issues, such as aquifer protection, waterfowl management, and flood control 
that are critical to reducing the problems associated with water insecurity.  The absence of a 
comprehensive long-term plan for addressing water insecurity and the exclusion of a broad 
collaborative agenda between the federal and non-federal sponsors are notable oversights in the 
discourse emanating from decision makers.  These are necessary to meet irrigation water demand 
and environmental outcomes in an important and dynamic project area. 
Policy Implications 
It was apparent, from the evidence emerging from this research, that many of the national 
level policy interventions in the water management and agricultural sector in Uzbekistan were 
top-down directives framed in economic terms.  The data in this dissertation highlights the fact 
that there are some institutional, financial and technological variables that have substantial 
bearings on agricultural policy outcomes.  These other factors include, but are not limited to, the 
use of WUAs, levels of management participation, and the nature of the cost-sharing scenario 
used for nationwide policy implementation strategy.  Taken together these variables create 




can impinge on the performance of key stakeholders.  Hence, what is required is context-specific 
evidence for more collaborative approaches to agricultural policymaking.  Approaches that will 
also use knowledge of the heterogeneity among the population to improve the allocation of 
resources and to foster sustainability through policymaking.  Policies that exclude issues relevant 
to farmers’ welfare, the environment, and social equity will ultimately fail to address key 
problems associated with water insecurity. 
According to Imperial (2012), sustainable development and management of water 
resources requires the Integrated Water Resources Management approach, which in turn 
demands the integration of the efforts of all stakeholders as well as decentralization of 
management authority to ensure efficiency, accountability, best management practices, and the 
technical expertise of the private sector.  Additionally, the participation of all stakeholders, 
particularly the beneficiaries, promotes the economic and financial stability to account for the 
opportunity costs of withdrawing and delivering water.  This approach includes the costs 
associated with economic and environmental externalities.  The drought in the United States over 
the past four years is a reminder that American agriculture is not immune to the problems that 
farmers in other parts of the world have been facing for decades now -- extreme weather, drought 
and flooding.  
Policy responses to water insecurity need to be conditioned by a new perception of the 
problem.  Redefining water insecurity as a problem connected to all dimensions of sustainable 
development, including agriculture, industry, and the environment, would help to focus attention 
on underlying causes and the inter-connected challenges associated with this very complex issue.  
Integrating conservation in Arkansas’ state water resource policy through different frames would 




actor-multiple sector approach may lead to a change in the policy venue, therefore traditional 
practices of agricultural exceptionalism will be expunged from the policy process.  Policy 
changes occur whenever there are changes in institutional venue and/or problem definition and 
new policy entrepreneurs take advantage of ‘policy windows’ (see Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 
and Kingdon, 1995).  
There is a need, first and foremost, for a strong government commitment focusing on 
developing the capacity of key stakeholders.  While the government provides the capital base for 
resource development, incentives are required to encourage private investment in resource 
processing, generating increased income potential.  Theoretically, almost any policy could be 
employed to align private resource use rates with the socially optimal rates of use.  Mandated 
standards could impose socially preferred practices on resource owners.  A schedule of taxes, 
fees, or fines could be devised to raise the private, current cost of resource use to levels reflecting 
long-run social values.  However, voluntary behavior in response to positive incentives has been 
the predominant mechanism for achieving agriculturally related resource conservation policy 
objectives.  This study utilized categorical variables to handle the endogeneity of state policy 
choices and examined whether management and governance of water resources affects water use 
outcomes in irrigated agriculture. 
The findings of this study have far reaching policy implications for institutional and 
infrastructural strengthening and capacity building.  Policymakers should pay close attention to 
supporting the development of community–based associations that have emerged to satisfy the 
specific needs of their members.  In this study, some WUAs in the Aral Sea basin, and BMWMD 
in eastern Arkansas received higher levels of participation from stakeholder farmers than did the 




training, group development, and capacity building strategies that harness and use the human and 
social capitals available within these local organizations.  National agricultural policy outcomes 
are dependent on these successes.  Whether the government and the institutions charged with the 
responsibility of delivering services to stakeholder farmers have the mechanisms, resources, and 
political will to provide these goods and services as public goods will be a pivotal consideration 
for the future of sustainable development in both study regions. 
Limitations of the Study 
The scope and depth of this study were limited by the funding available for its execution.  
Therefore, sampling was restricted to the Aral Sea region of Uzbekistan, and follow-up 
interviews or focus group discussions with the participants, which would have helped to provide 
more far-reaching analysis of farmers’ experiences, were not done. 
Additionally, this study did not take into account the impact of land tenure, which was 
referenced in the review of the literature as a long-standing issue of importance in the agriculture 
sector.  Access to land and the availability of water are factors that could potentially influence 
the behavior of stakeholder farmers but the issue of land ownership in Uzbekistan is complex 
(see Abdullaev et al., 2009; Bektemirov and Rahimov, 2001; Wegerich and Bektemirov, 2001 
for a discussion).  Therefore, it was a deliberate decision to exclude overt references to the 
subject that is often examined with regards to social issues. 
Contribution to the Literature 
This work contributes to the policy debate in the growing field of program evaluation 




project-specific indicators in common-pool resource management through the context of 
economic development and the environment.  The research may serve to reorient the thinking of 
policymakers so that they recognize that there are local factors that must be included in efforts to 
mitigate to the impact of water insecurity.  It illuminates the need for policymakers to be mindful 
of heterogeneity among the stakeholders and to use this knowledge to inform the efficient and 
effective allocation of scarce resources.  Exploring the synergetic relationships between 
institutions and natural capital to enhance water availability are also key strategies for improving 
human well-being and socio-economic development, and for preserving ecosystems. 
In addition to the foregoing, the data also highlights historical themes in policymaking 
that are embedded in sectoral policy discourse and the disjuncture between those interventions 
and current approaches needed to increase the capacity of stakeholder farmers in the study 
regions.  Consequently, this research contributes to the debate on water security by advancing the 
notion that the examination of otherwise overlooked variables, which do not constitute dominant 
frames, can provide useful data for innovative context-specific approaches to guide water 
security policymaking and improve water security outcomes.  According to UN-Water (2013), 
water security should be defined as “the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access 
to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, 
and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and 
water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political 




Suggestions for Future Research 
Where the research on agricultural development and water security strategies goes next is 
important to national level policymaking in Uzbekistan.  Consideration of the fact that water is a 
social, economic, environmental and political factor should lead to research that transcends 
agriculture, to cut across many different ministerial, disciplinary and policy fields.  Thus, 
addressing water security research in a collaborative inter-sectoral manner is crucial.  
Researchers would be well advised to examine factors influencing water insecurity for the 
complex issues that undermine achievement of water security.  A re-definition of the problem to 
include input from other sectors in society is suggested.  Policies formulated to achieve water 
security outcomes need to be coordinated across multiple government agencies.  Following from 
that, future research should address the paucity of evidence pertaining to the impact of specific 
policies on target populations.  Therefore, monitoring and evaluating policies in the agricultural 
sector is another important researchable area.  These studies will provide feedback to 
policymakers and to allow for changes to be made to policies as deemed necessary. 
At state and local level policymaking in Arkansas, I argue that projects like the one in 
Bayou Meto Basin could be categorized as a public-private partnership (PPP) in irrigation water 
supply.  PPPs are a mechanism for governments to procure and implement public infrastructure 
and/or services using the resources and expertise of the private sector.  PPPs should be 
encouraged in the irrigation sector for the processes of planning, development, and management.  
It has been observed internationally that PPPs are successful if the government or multilateral 
agencies contribute substantially to capital costs, and private parties are made to undertake O&M 
activities so as to introduce improved technology and achieve efficiency in the operations of the 




In conclusion, researchers and policymakers’ emphasis on the biophysical factors that 
impact agricultural productivity often serve to detract from the other multifunctional dimensions 
of agriculture that potentially facilitate positive spin-off impacts on water security (Gibson, 
2012).  Case studies demonstrating the value and merits of agricultural multifunctionality, for 
instance, could expand discussion on water security to include other sectors of the economy and 
widen the range of possible solutions on common-pool resource problems. 
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